

# Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

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JANUARY, 1972

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# Current History

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# Current History

JANUARY, 1972

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*What are the prospects for lessened tensions in the Middle East? What are the chances for an Israeli-Arab agreement? In this issue, seven articles examine the situation in seven states of the troubled region. As our first article points out: "The importance of security and its centrality in Israeli thinking have been obvious from the inception of the state. A truism of the Israeli system has been that defeat in war would mean politicalicide—the murder of the state."*

## Israel's Quest for Security

BY BERNARD REICH

*Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, The George Washington University*

ISRAEL'S OVERRIDING CONCERN is with national survival and security—imperatives deriving from the conflict with her Arab neighbors. All aspects of life in Israel, directly or indirectly, relate to this central concern and are dominated by it. This has prevailed since Israel's establishment, when her declaration of independence was greeted by an invasion of hostile Arab armies dedicated to her destruction. The three major Arab-Israeli wars (1948–1949, 1956, 1967) all left their mark, but none resulted in a permanent and meaningful peace.

<sup>1</sup> See Bernard Reich, "America in the Middle East: Changing Aspects in US Policy," *New Middle East* (London), No. 1 (October, 1968), pages 9–13. The perceived danger in renewed conflict has become an increasingly important factor in the equation, particularly since the advent of the Nixon Administration.

<sup>2</sup> Between August 29 and September 1, 1967, leaders of 12 Arab states held a summit conference in Khartoum to formulate policy in the wake of the June War. At the conclusion of the conference they pledged "to eliminate the consequences of aggression" and to assure Israel's withdrawal from Arab lands. They further noted their commitment to the principle of "no peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel."

The June War of 1967, however, was of such magnitude and character that it brought into being conditions vastly different than those prevailing before the conflict; these new conditions have had a clear and far-reaching impact on Israel's political system and on her economic and social infrastructure. The war increased Israel's territorial size and improved her defense posture. It also significantly affected politics in the Arab states and the course of inter-Arab relations. The euphoria which followed the termination of hostilities combined with, and in part resulting from, the extent of changes wrought by the war led many observers to suggest that peace between Israel and the Arab states might be attainable. This was an important factor in the changed United States approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict which, since 1967, has actively sought the achievement of peace.<sup>1</sup> But the adamant Arab stand and the Arab refusal to negotiate with Israel (symbolized most dramatically by the "three no's" of Khartoum<sup>2</sup>), the activities of the Palestinian terrorist and guerrilla groups, and the hostilities between

Israel and the Arabs which followed the war quickly diminished the prospects for a dramatic change in the Arab-Israeli relationship and continued to focus the attention of most Israelis on "war and peace" rather than on domestic economic and social issues.

Israel's domestic problems receded from the forefront of public attention and of governmental concern, planning and expenditure. The focus on national defense was ensured by continued Arab hostility and by the improvement of economic and social conditions in Israel following the 1967 war. The recession which had characterized the economy before the 1967 conflict became an economic boom, with full employment, shortly thereafter.<sup>3</sup> Building construction developed rapidly and exports grew. The slackening immigration rate reversed itself. The demand for foreign currency (especially dollars) for military equipment was positively assisted by the increasing influx of tourists<sup>4</sup> and an increase in contributions from World Jewry. Israel's life style materially improved

and increased prosperity characterized the post-conflict period.<sup>5</sup>

### DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSENSUS

National security considerations have had a catalytic effect on domestic politics and the political consensus. The crisis of May, 1967, and the war which followed in June helped to coalesce Israeli thinking (particularly about the danger of the situation) and to draw Israel's political factions closer together despite diverse political ideologies and contending politicians. The crisis was ultimately met with the creation of a government of national unity—a coalition of virtually all political parties<sup>6</sup>—which survived the vicissitudes of political life until Gahal's withdrawal in the summer of 1970. The government of national unity remained united on the need for peace and security, the concept of danger and threat, and the view that a return to the pre-June 5, 1967, armistice lines was unacceptable. The basic government position was that peace had to be achieved through direct negotiations with the Arabs and that captured Arab territory should not be relinquished until that time.

The period of stress also fostered the merger and alliance of the major left-of-center socialist political parties, which had been political rivals of some intensity despite the relative similarity of their positions on most issues. The desirability of cooperation to present a united front with regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute contributed to the creation of a climate suitable for the consummation of the merger. On January 21, 1968, Mapai<sup>7</sup> merged with two other labor parties—Ahdut Ha'avoda-Poale Zion (the United Labor Workers of Zion) and Rafi (Israel Labor List)—to form Mifleget Ha'avoda Ha-Israelit (the Israel Labor party).<sup>8</sup> The merger of the parties, like the formation of the government of national unity, did not eliminate differences among the politicians or their parties—but rather shifted the quarrels to the intra-governmental and intra-party spheres. Israel has had a perennial coalition government in which the small but essential partners of Mapai (and now the Israel Labor

<sup>3</sup> Israel has approximately 1,000,000 employed workers out of a total population of just over 3,000,000. In May, 1971, only 923 persons were registered as unemployed and during the same month it was estimated that nearly 41,000 jobs were left unfilled. *Israel Economist*, August, 1971, p. 246. The Arabs of the administered territories are an important source of labor for the Israeli economy. Official figures show a minimum of 30,000 Arabs at work in Israeli industry and it is estimated that perhaps an additional 10,000 are privately employed or employed by Israeli Arabs.

<sup>4</sup> In 1971, Israel had in excess of 500,000 tourists for the first time. Tourism not only reflected the improved security situation but also spurred the economy and was a major earner of foreign currency, estimated in excess of \$100 million per year.

<sup>5</sup> In August, 1971, Israel devalued her pound from its previous rate of 3.5 to the dollar to 4.2 to the dollar. This followed President Nixon's announcement of his new economic policy and its effective devaluation of the U.S. dollar. The 20 per cent devaluation of the pound was viewed by many Israeli economists as an overdue and essential act (*Israel Economist*, August, 1971, p. 244), although it came at a time when the economy had increasing labor unrest, resulting in strikes, warning strikes, slowdowns and related labor problems.

<sup>6</sup> Israel's two Communist parties were excluded.

<sup>7</sup> Mapai has been the predominant political party in Israel and was the major political force in the pre-independence Jewish quasi-government in Mandatory Palestine.

<sup>8</sup> In November, 1968, this party and Mapam (United Workers' Party) agreed to an alliance for submission of joint lists of candidates for the 1969 Knesset (Parliament) elections.



party) have had a disproportionate voice in matters such as the role of religion in the state, national service obligations for women and so forth.

Despite the merger of the three major left-of-center labor socialist parties, coalition governments remain an essential part of the political dynamic. In such a situation, political leadership and succession are important factors. Prime Minister Golda Meir continues to maintain firm control over the political reins, but she has indicated that her retirement is not too far in the future. Succession to leadership is likely to develop into a major political issue between the obvious younger front-runners—Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education and Culture Yigal Allon—although the political mantle might still be retained by older generation leaders like Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir. A shift in leadership personalities and/or generations would bring about a change in political style and probably in the decision-making process, but the impact on substantive issues is likely to be limited in the realm of security and foreign policy, where the political consensus is widespread with regard to goal and objective, if not always specific tactics.

Israel does not face national elections for several years and it is then that these political issues will be most clearly faced by the elec-

torate. Only Mrs. Meir's departure from the political scene before the next Knesset election would provide a basic test of Israel's domestic and foreign policies. But Israelis tend to be conservative in their voting patterns, notwithstanding the intensity of their political views and extensive political participation. The 1969 election did not substantially alter the party composition of the Knesset, despite the establishment of the Israel Labor party and its election alignment with Mapam, and it provided the government with an expressed popular view for continuity. No domestic event since has fostered a need to change the government's basic approaches to the political, economic and security issues facing Israel.<sup>9</sup>

### THE SEARCH FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT

The United States cease-fire initiative of June, 1970, provided the first serious challenge to the political cohesiveness and relative domestic tranquility which seemed to develop in Israel in the wake of the June War. But the debate and discussion which accompanied it, as well as the resumed Jarring talks and the search for an interim settlement, also reaffirmed the centrality of national security in the Israeli system.

On June 25, 1970, Secretary of State William Rogers announced a new United States political initiative in the Middle East, "the objective of which is to encourage the parties to stop shooting and start talking under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. . . ."<sup>10</sup>

Israel's initial reaction, expressed by Mrs. Meir in a speech to the Knesset on June 29, 1970, was to reject a temporary cease-fire because it would facilitate Arab preparations for resuming hostilities against Israel. While the government was discussing the proposal, Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced Egypt's conditional acceptance of the cease-fire on July 23, 1970.<sup>11</sup> On August 4, 1970, Golda Meir announced Israel's affirmative decision in the Knesset and the reply was transmitted to the United States Department of State. Israel's response emphasized the importance of the United States' assurances which had facilitated her acceptance of

<sup>9</sup> This has remained true despite the beginnings of a vocal social protest group of "Black Panthers" seeking to draw attention to the problem of poverty and to get their share of society—they want to be co-opted in rather than excluded. But Israel's "Black Panther" group "lacks numerical strength and political weight," it has "as yet no programme of any kind," and it has "no coherent ideology, no clear programme and no positive practical demands. . . ." See Nissim Rejwan, "The Myth of the Black Panthers—and the Reality of the Ethnic Gap," *New Middle East*, No. 37 (October, 1971), p. 19.

<sup>10</sup> Department of State Press Release No. 193, June 25, 1970, p. 3. For the text of the initiative announcement as well as of the letter Rogers sent to U.A.R. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad see *Current History*, January, 1971, pp 46, 50 and 51. For fuller discussion of this initiative and U.S. policy in its wake see Bernard Reich, "United States Policy in the Middle East," *Current History*, January, 1971, pp. 1 ff.

<sup>11</sup> Jordan concurred on July 26. Syria, Iraq and the guerrilla organizations opposed the cease-fire. See *The New York Times*, July 27, 1970.

the initiative.<sup>12</sup> The decision to accept the proposal led to the breakup of the government of national unity—Gahal voted to withdraw from the coalition.<sup>13</sup>

The cease-fire formally went into effect along the Suez Canal on August 7, 1970, but was immediately followed by reports of Egyptian military deployments in the stand-still zone in violation of the agreements. Indirect talks between Israel, Jordan and the U.A.R., held under the auspices of United Nations Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, began on August 25, 1970, but, after the initial round, Israel's United Nations ambassador was called home. The Egyptian violations had caused consternation in Israel and the initial United States reaction, which minimized the problem, did not allay Israel's fears. By early

<sup>12</sup> See *The New York Times*, August 5, 1970.

<sup>13</sup> The decision to withdraw was reached by a vote of 117 to 112 in Gahal's central committee. The Cabinet vote on accepting the U.S. proposal was 17 in favor with 6 abstentions. Gahal had agreed to the concept of a limited cease-fire but objected to the idea of withdrawal from occupied Arab territory implicit in the U.S. proposal. Menachem Begin, Gahal's leader, described the coalition as "a government of national surrender to a Middle East Munich." See *The New York Times*, August 1, 1970, and the *Washington Post*, August 1 and 4, 1970.

<sup>14</sup> *The New York Times*, September 7, 1970.

<sup>15</sup> The government statement said, in part: "The present political and military conditions enable and justify the termination of the suspension of Israel participation in the talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring." Cited in "Report by the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East," U.N. Document S/10070, 4 January, 1971, Annex II, p. 6. Mrs. Meir stressed the importance of U.S. "clarifications" and military, economic and political support in Israel's decision in her Knesset speech of December 29, 1970, in which she informed Parliament of the decision to return to the talks.

<sup>16</sup> The document was published in *Jeune Afrique*, No. 525, January 26, 1971, pp. 20-21.

<sup>17</sup> The U.A.R. responded on January 15 and its aide-memoire was later circulated as U.N. Document S/10083 (20 January, 1971). Jordan's response was circulated as U.N. Document S/10089 (26 January, 1971).

<sup>18</sup> Israel announced, on February 2, that she would observe the cease-fire on a mutual basis. In a speech to Egypt's National Assembly on February 4, President Anwar Sadat declared that the U.A.R. would maintain the cease-fire for an additional 30-day period ending on March 7, 1971.

<sup>19</sup> "Further Report by the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East," U.N. Document S/10070/Add.2, 5 March, 1971, p. 2.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3. For the text of the Jarring letter to Egypt and Israel and their responses see *The New York Times*, March 8 and March 11, 1971.

September, the Israeli Cabinet had decided that it would not participate in the talks so long as the agreement was not respected in its entirety and if the original situation was not restored.<sup>14</sup>

On December 28, 1970, Israel's Cabinet unanimously decided to resume peace talks with the U.A.R. and Jordan, under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. This decision followed a lengthy process of discussion and clarification between the United States and Israel during which Israel received political, economic and military support to "rectify" the imbalance resulting from the Egyptian missile movements and to allow her to reenter the talks in a position of confidence.<sup>15</sup> On January 5, 1971, the talks were resumed, and immediately there was a brief flurry of activity. Ambassador Jarring visited Jerusalem at Israel's invitation and received a detailed position paper containing Israel's views on United Nations Resolution 242 and the various elements involved in the peace discussions.<sup>16</sup> Jordan and Egypt quickly responded to these points in memoranda to Jarring.<sup>17</sup> Shortly thereafter, Israel and Egypt agreed to extend the cease-fire.<sup>18</sup>

Ambassador Jarring felt that, at this stage of the talks, he should make clear his views on what he believed to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which the parties had agreed to carry out in all its parts.<sup>19</sup>

On February 8, 1971, he handed identical aide-memoires to the representatives of the U.A.R. and Israel requesting them to make "certain prior commitments" to him on the central points—Israel's withdrawal from occupied U.A.R. territory and the U.A.R.'s entering into a peace agreement with Israel—which would be prerequisites of a peace settlement between them.<sup>20</sup>

The U.A.R. response, dated February 15, 1971, discussed various aspects of the peace settlement and included the critical phrase "enter into a peace agreement with Israel." Israel's response of February 26, 1971, welcomed Egypt's willingness to enter into a peace agreement, and reiterated her willing-

ness to enter into meaningful negotiations on all aspects of a settlement. On the central question of withdrawal, Israel said she would undertake "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Israel-U.A.R. cease-fire line to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. Israel will not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines."<sup>21</sup>

At this juncture, the search for peace took on an added dimension when the United States, reflecting its view that an impasse had been reached,<sup>22</sup> launched its effort to achieve an "interim" agreement on the re-opening of the Suez Canal and a pullback of Israeli forces from the waterway's eastern bank. In a press conference on April 23, 1971, Secretary of State William Rogers announced that he was going to the Middle East and that he hoped his visit would play a constructive role toward the achievement of peace in light of the "exceptional opportunity" to build on existing progress. But no substantial progress was made, and in the fall of 1971 the United States adopted a more assertive role with regard to the interim agreement. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly on October 4, 1971, Rogers outlined a series of six specific points with regard to an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt concerning the Suez Canal.\*

To Israel, the Rogers' speech seemed like a more problematic replay of the Rogers' Plan of December, 1969,<sup>23</sup> which she had strongly

opposed. Golda Meir commented that the speech "most regrettably, failed to contribute to the advancement of the special arrangement for the opening of the Suez Canal."<sup>24</sup> Israel was concerned that this "Second Rogers Plan" (as the Israelis referred to it), combined with a United States reluctance to supply Israel with additional Phantom jets, represented yet another erosion in the United States' position,<sup>25</sup> and not only weakened Israel's relations with the United States, but, perhaps more critically, threatened Israel's negotiating position and her security. It seemed to foreshadow increased problems in the search for an Arab-Israeli peace.<sup>26</sup>

## PROSPECT

In the fifth year of the Six Day War, Israel continues to devote the largest part of her budget, her manpower and her decision-making machinery to the problems of security and defense. Within this context, defense expenditures and the retention of Arab territories captured in the June War take on an added significance—the former provides for military equipment and manpower, while the latter ensures strategic positions considered essential for security until peace is achieved.

In the fall of 1971, Israel had an unprecedented public discussion of her defense budget, which included proposals to cut expenditure. But despite suggestions that defense funds could be better spent on social services—on butter, not guns—the prevailing trend was toward the retention of the defense budget virtually intact and reduction of other budgetary allocations. In an interview with

(Continued on page 48)

\* Editor's note: For the relevant portions of the speech, see pp. 44 ff. of this issue.

<sup>21</sup> Text in *The New York Times*, March 8, 1971.

<sup>22</sup> In a press conference on March 16, 1971, Rogers commented: "At the moment . . . there is what seems to be an impasse [in the Jarring mission]. We are convinced that that impasse can be overcome. We are going to see that it is overcome. . . ."

<sup>23</sup> For the text of Rogers remarks see "A Lasting Peace in the Middle East: An American View," an address by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Department of State Publication 8507, January, 1970.

<sup>24</sup> *Jerusalem Post*, October 7, 1971.

<sup>25</sup> See, for example, *Jerusalem Post* editorial, "Rogers' Repeat Performance," October 8, 1971.

<sup>26</sup> Israel's views on an interim settlement and on the importance of security were elaborated in a speech by Mrs. Meir to the Knesset on October 26, 1971. For significant excerpts see *Jerusalem Post*, October 27, 1971.

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*"The root of Egypt's problem goes deep: it is the absence of a sense of commitment capable of energizing the youth, revitalizing the bureaucracy and stimulating productivity and production."*

## Egypt Since Nasser

BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

*Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania*

**G**AMAL ABDEL NASSER ruled Egypt for almost two decades. The first *Egyptian* to rule in Egypt since the time of the Pharaohs, he captured the imagination of the Arab world and was a major figure in world affairs. Under his leadership, Egypt cast off the remnants of British colonial rule, initiated extensive political, economic and social reforms to modernize the country and move it into the twentieth century, and embarked on an ambitious course designed to set Egypt in the vanguard of Arab unity and Middle Eastern and African affairs. Nasser's policy of internal transformation was, however, frustrated as much by international developments as by the oppressive legacy of domestic burdens that are rooted in Egyptian history and life.

Considerable attention has been devoted in Western literature to Egypt's foreign policy: the turn to the Soviet Union in 1955; the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July, 1956, and the Israeli-Anglo-French attack in October-November, 1956; Nasser's setbacks in promoting Arab unity and his feuds with various Arab states; the Egyptian intervention in Yemen from 1962 to 1967; the third Arab-Israeli war in June, 1967; and the increasing Egyptian involvement with the Soviet Union since 1967, epitomized by the 15-year Treaty of Friendship signed on May 27, 1971. This focus on foreign policy behavior will continue, given the danger of a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the event of another major outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East.

Yet internal developments will inevitably have a strong influence on foreign policy, and therefore also warrant systematic analysis. Since Nasser's death, Cairo's foreign policy has basically changed little, but there have been important domestic developments: the initial smooth transition of power; the Sadat government's efforts to improve economic conditions and revitalize internal reform amidst sharpening economic distress; the dramatic succession crisis that resulted in the emergence of Anwar Sadat as the leading political figure in post-Nasser Egypt; and the adoption of a new constitution, indicating a renewed effort by the leadership to fashion a responsive political structure.

### THE TRANSFER OF POWER

The death of Nasser on September 28, 1970, signified the end of an era in the history of modern Egypt. Nasser left no appointed successor. His style was to shuffle potential rivals frequently and to operate through his personal secretariat. When he died the main centers of power were the military, the Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.), Egypt's only legal political organization, established in 1962, and the secret police. The men who wielded power decided to appoint Anwar Sadat as interim President; he had been made Vice President on December 20, 1969. A month later, the National Assembly formally elected him President, after he had secured 90 per cent of the vote in a national referendum held on October 15, 1970 (there was no other name on the ballot).



Sadat is often referred to as an Egyptian "Harry Truman." In view of his success in thwarting an attempted palace coup by high ranking associates in May, 1971, the accolade would seem well deserved, though initially it was intended as a slight. A man of humble origins, Sadat graduated from the military academy in 1938, became friendly with Nasser the following year, and was one of the officers who joined with Nasser to overthrow King Farouk in July, 1952. Little was expected from Sadat because he was not a close confidante of Nasser's in the 1960's. Egyptians consider him sincere and interested in improving the standard of living of the average man. He quickly superseded Nasser as the butt of the mordant, pointed and irreverent political jokes that so delight Egyptians.

According to one joke, God was admitting deserving people into Heaven and asked each prospective applicant to prove his identity by reference to an outstanding characteristic. When Nasser appeared, God asked for proof of his identity. "I can talk for four hours at a time," Nasser replied, and was recognized. Next came General Hakim Amer (who committed suicide after the defeat in 1967). "I smoke hashish," he said, and was also admitted. Then came Sadat. When God asked him to identify himself, Sadat replied, "There is nothing outstanding about me." "Ah, yes, you must be Sadat," said God, and admitted him. However, his very "ordinariness" is a strength. He is providing the Egyptians with a welcome respite from the high tension era of dramatic and frequent policy shifts and initiatives. Since May, 1971, he has sought to dismantle many of Nasser's stringent political and security controls and to seek political forms less openly authoritarian and more responsive to local needs, but still capable of keeping him in power.

Sadat has acted to ameliorate some of Egypt's pressing problems and to broaden the base of his popular support. He selected Mahmoud Fawzi, the 72-year-old veteran diplomat, as Premier. A brilliant and skilled career civil servant, Fawzi reorganized the Cabinet and upper echelons of the governmental administrative network with a view

toward improving efficiency, stimulating economic production, and raising the level of public services, especially in Cairo (Fawzi was also one of the architects of Egypt's post-Nasser diplomatic offensive designed to bring maximum international pressure on Israel to withdraw to the June 4, 1967, lines). The Sadat-Fawzi leadership wooed the lower classes: it lowered the prices of staples like tea, sugar and cooking oil; improved Cairo's sorely overburdened system of public transportation; repaired roads; and tried to push ahead with long-delayed social, economic, and welfare reforms.

It also started a cautious policy of reconciliation with the "old bourgeoisie" by dropping the sequestration cases pending against private individuals and families and by ordering a return of some of the land and property seized illegally and/or arbitrarily in the past from Egyptian citizens. Under Nasser, part of the campaign of sequestration had been politically motivated—to impoverish and thereby to weaken a social stratum perceived as hostile to the regime.

## THE PERENNIAL PROBLEMS

Any Egyptian leadership must take into account Egypt's critical problems: overpopulation, poverty, low productivity and social stagnation. These are long-standing and of such magnitude as to be nearly insoluble.

Ninety-five per cent of Egypt is desert. The population of more than 34 million is increasing at about 3 per cent per year—one of the highest rates in the world. It is concentrated in the Nile Valley and the delta region, north of Cairo. In the early 1960's, the government committed itself officially to a policy of family planning and birth control. However, little headway has been made. The conservative religious leaders who are still influential in the approximately 5,000 villages where 75 per cent of the population live are opposed to birth control; and to the fellahin (the peasants) who are generally uneducated, illiterate and medieval in outlook, the issue is academic. Whatever increase in food production Egypt has achieved in recent years has been consumed by the burgeoning popu-

lation; there has been no noticeable improvement in the diet of the average Egyptian. Indeed, Egypt must import between \$100- and \$150-million worth of grains annually. Prior to 1965, she met most of her food deficit by imports from the United States on very favorable terms. However, relations between the two countries deteriorated sharply in early 1965, and no American assistance has been forthcoming since then. Moscow has become Egypt's principal benefactor.

Egyptian leaders have high expectations from the Aswan High Dam, completed in late 1970. A magnificent engineering achievement, it is the most impressive structure built in the Middle East since the Pyramids. The British built the first small dam across the Nile in 1898, and a number of others were built subsequently, the purpose being to control the flow of the Nile in the dry season in order to promote irrigation for intensive agricultural production. The Aswan High Dam was constructed with Soviet aid. (The United States had originally agreed to finance the project, but precipitately withdrew its support in July, 1956, setting in motion Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal and the chain of events that led to the Israeli-Anglo-French attack against Egypt in October, 1956.)

The Aswan High Dam provides water for the reclamation of more than one million acres of desert land, as well as hydroelectric power for Egypt's planned industrial development and electrification. Its completion was a source of great pride to all Egyptians. Politically, it is the showpiece of Egyptian "socialism"; however, economically and ecologically it is proving a mixed blessing.

Modern technological achievements often bring with them unanticipated ecological consequences and create new sets of problems for politicians and planners alike. Now that the Nile waters are contained behind the High Dam, they no longer deposit each year the layer of topsoil rich in nutrients for renewing the land. To offset this loss, Egypt has had to embark, with Soviet assistance, on the building of an extensive artificial fertilizer industry. Unlike the annual flooding of the

Nile which distributed the nutrients easily and evenly throughout the Nile valley, the artificial method of enriching the soil entails the establishment of a system of deliveries of fertilizer to all the villages. For maximum effectiveness the deliveries must be timely, and the peasants must learn to use the fertilizer efficiently—both very difficult feats for Egypt at her present level of organization and distributive capability.

Expectations for agriculture have also been dealt a setback by the initial results from the newly reclaimed land: the productivity is lower than that of the long-farmed areas, the costs of irrigation and fertilizer are high, and the increased salinity is making agriculture costly and difficult. In late September, 1971, Sadat acknowledged that the desert reclamation project had encountered unforeseen difficulties due to ineptitude and inefficiency, and he promised drastic reforms.

The silt-free water flowing through the High Dam has virtually eliminated marine life in the Nile River, from Aswan to the Mediterranean Sea, 600 miles away. The effect has been to bring to near extinction the once-lucrative sardine industry and to deplete the supply of fish, which once fed on the plant life in the Nile. Sardine production fell from 18,000 tons annually in 1964 to less than 500 tons in 1971. Finally, the High Dam has had the effect of making the scourge of Egypt—bilharzia—even more virulent. Bilharzia, also known as schistosomiasis, is carried by snails and breeds in slow-moving waters, and the High Dam has slowed the flow of the Nile. It is a disease that affects the intestines and liver, and causes a gradual depletion of energy and stamina. The tiny worms attach themselves to people who work in the water, and since the fellahin work in the canals and streams and bathe and water animals there, most of them become infected early in life. Of course, the electric power produced by the dam is essential for Egypt's industrialization. But the decision to build one huge dam rather than a series of small ones may prove to have been a grievous error.

One of the bright spots in an otherwise unpromising economic situation has been the

development of Egypt's infant oil industry. Thanks to discoveries of oil by American firms operating in the western desert and the Gulf of Suez, the country is on the threshold of self-sufficiency, and a profitable surplus for export seems imminent. In August, 1971, Egypt entered into an agreement with an international consortium to construct two parallel pipelines connecting the Gulf of Suez with the Mediterranean. The pipelines will have a capacity of 80 million tons of oil a year and, when completed in 1975, will bring Egypt more than one \$100 million a year in transit fees.

### SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Egypt's social problems are staggering. According to government statistics, 65 per cent of the population is illiterate; the figure may actually be as high as 80 per cent. As the semi-official newspaper, *Al Ahram*, has noted:

Despite the strenuous efforts being exerted, especially after 1952, illiteracy is growing rather than shrinking. This is due to the fact that primary education does not cover all eligible children, and left-outs amount to some 20 per cent. Likewise, graduates of the primary schools do not find suitable reading material, so they become illiterate again.

There is also a severe teacher shortage because college graduates refuse to accept employment in the villages, which lack the amenities of urban life.

Premier Mahmoud Fawzi has said that Egypt's educational system "can no longer be repaired by patching. In fact, it is beyond repair." This bleak assessment is mirrored in the deep-seated dispiritedness of Egypt's university students. There are about 200,000 students attending university-level courses, the overwhelming number in non-scientific, non-technologically oriented courses: less than six per cent are enrolled in the natural sciences or engineering.

Until 1968, all university graduates were provided with jobs by the government, but seldom in a specialty of interest to the graduate. Salaries were low; advancement was slow; and initiative was discouraged. Over-

employment was designed to forestall political restiveness. At present, all university graduates are supposed to serve in the army "for the duration," thereby taking some of the pressure off bureaucracies already swollen with over-trained, underworked, unmotivated university graduates. Despite the government's efforts to retain its ablest people, thousands of Egyptian scientists, technicians and teachers emigrated during the 1960's. The "brain drain" has hit Egypt particularly hard, since she can ill-afford to lose to the West and to other Arab countries her technically trained personnel at a time when the country's modernization efforts are being intensified.

Notwithstanding the official commitment to educational and social change, tradition is very powerful. There have been periodic attempts to improve the quality of university education, but these founder on a shortage of economic resources and the inability of the would-be reformers to challenge the entrenched power of educational conservatives, who believe that the Koran is the key to teaching about the modern era and who resist attempts to "secularize" education. For example, during the Nasser era, a leading official responsible for cultural and educational affairs deliberately bypassed writers who sought to express themselves in the vernacular, because he believed that only those writing in classical Arabic should be rewarded and employed, even though few people could read the classical Arabic.

Attempts to introduce social reforms have met with stiff resistance. Thus far efforts to modernize divorce procedures have failed, in particular efforts to offer greater protection to women who, under Islamic law, can be divorced by the husband's merely saying, "I divorce you." There was a bill before the old National Assembly (now called the People's Assembly under the new Constitution adopted in September, 1971) which would have required that a divorce proceeding be held before a judge. However, though professing to believe in socialism and democracy, the tradition-bound members of the legislature never allowed the bill to come up for a vote. The reformers did succeed in gaining

acceptance for a provision that says that a husband can no longer obtain police assistance to force the return of a wife who has decided to leave him—a rare phenomenon anyway in Muslim society. Without a secularization of attitudes and institutions, Egypt's modernization will be fitful and superficial.

### SADAT'S PREEMPTIVE PURGE

The outward unity of the post-Nasser leadership ended on May 2, 1971, when President Anwar Sadat dismissed Aly Sabry as Vice President. While a surprise, this was not a startling development. Sabry has had a checkered career. He was one of the officers in the small group Nasser led in the overthrow of King Farouk on July 23, 1952, and a frequent holder of high office: e.g., he was Secretary-General of the Arab Socialist Union until the June, 1967, Arab-Israeli war; prior to that, from 1961 to 1965, he served as Premier. However, Aly Sabry was never an intimate of Nasser's, nor was he a major political power. He favored close relations with the Soviet Union, but since his political fortunes and misfortunes were generally viewed as a barometer of Egyptian-Soviet relations, Nasser probably accorded or denied him status depending on the impression that Nasser wanted to convey abroad about his relationship with Moscow.

On May 13, 1971, Sadat ousted Sharawy Gomaa, a Deputy Premier and Minister of Interior, who had long been considered a powerful figure because of his control over the secret police. Gomaa's dismissal prompted resignations by five other Cabinet ministers, who were apparently part of the anti-Sadat coalition and who sought to undermine Sadat's popular support by their resignations. During the next few days, Sadat acted forcefully, imprisoning dozens of top government and party officials. The list of the purged reads like a "Who's Who" of the Nasser era: Lieutenant General Mohammed Fawzi, Minister of War; Sami Sharaf, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs and long responsible for Nasser's personal intelligence and security organization; Mohammed Fayek, Minister of Information; Abdel Mohsen Abul Nur of the

A.S.U.; Ahmed Kamel, Chief of Intelligence; Labib Shukair, Speaker of the National Assembly; and Diaddin Daoud of the A.S.U. In all, 91 former high officials were placed on trial for "high treason" on August 25, 1971.

There is continuing controversy over whether Sadat acted defensively to prevent a coup that had already been planned or whether he took the initiative in order to eliminate his potential foes and consolidate his personal position. In a nationwide talk on May 14, he said that the conspirators had planned to create violent demonstrations on May 14 and 15 and, under the guise of intervening to defend public order, to depose the government. Sadat claimed that extensive "bugging" had been carried on by the secret police (this came as no surprise to anyone in Cairo), and he promised to curtail such illegal surveillance.

In retrospect, it appears that the chain of events triggering the May purges started with Sadat's unilateral decision to agree to a union of Egypt, Syria and Libya on April 17, 1971. The previous November, Egypt, Libya and the Sudan had agreed to draw up a detailed agreement outlining the steps for establishing a union among the three countries. Little was done: Egypt was preoccupied with the Israeli issue, and the Sudan had internal problems. But Libya persisted.

Frustrated by the failure of diplomatic efforts to exact concessions from Israeli, and beholden to Libya for financial support, Sadat seized the opportunity to enhance his popularity at home and in the Arab world by agreeing to this latest blueprint for Arab unity. At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the A.S.U. Central Committee between April 25 and 29, Aly Sabry, Abdel Mohsen Abul Nur and others sharply criticized Sadat for having agreed to the federation without consulting any of the key government or A.S.U. officials, and for accepting the principle of majority decisions as binding (i.e., Egypt would have been obligated to accept any course of action voted by Libya and Syria). Their attack also made clear their opposition to his entire policy. On April 30, as a result of an adverse vote in the A.S.U., Sadat agreed



to a revision of the federation's statutes, making unanimity necessary for all decisions by the three Presidents and limiting the authority of the federation to interfere in the internal affairs of the constituent members.

However, federation was only the apparent source of conflict; the nub of the matter was really the belief held by Sabry and others that Sadat was wielding too much power and that they must weaken him: at stake was rulership in Egypt. Stunned at having been outvoted in the A.S.U. Executive Committee, Sadat played for time. He secretly obtained assurances of loyalty from top military commanders and proved himself the consummate in-fighter, arresting his opponents and thwarting their efforts to fight back. Although there were policy differences among the top leaders, they were not at the heart of the struggle. The challenge to Sadat and the subsequent purge were generated as a result of the personal struggle of key officials for political power.

Sadat skillfully neutralized the Soviet factor in the domestic fight. His signing of a 15-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union on May 27, 1971, may have been motivated more by internal political considerations than by military and strategic ones. Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny came to Cairo with a high-level delegation on May 25 to assess the political situation and to discuss Cairo's deepening dialogue with Washington on the Middle East. Not only was Moscow disturbed by the removal of leading pro-Soviet elements from the Egyptian leadership, but it had invested too heavily in Egypt to accept the passive role of an outsider in any serious negotiations aimed at a Middle East settlement. The treaty calls for regular consultations between the Soviet and Egyptian governments "on all important questions affecting the interests of both states." It calls for continued strengthening of military cooperation and buttresses the extensive Soviet presence in Egypt. For Sadat, the treaty provides not only for a continued flow of Soviet military and economic assistance but, perhaps more important, for Soviet non-interference in Egypt's domestic political struggle. Moscow will not lift a

finger to help its former friends now in the dock.

### **OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES**

On July 23, 1971, on the occasion of the nineteenth anniversary of the revolution, Sadat promised a national meeting of the Arab Socialist Union that 1971 would be "the year of decision" in the struggle against Israel. He announced that a new constitution would be adopted. He called also for a thorough reorganization of the A.S.U. and for major economic and administrative reforms. In denouncing Israel and hinting at a resumption of hostilities, he reiterated his intention to remove "the traces of the Israeli aggression": "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, depth for depth, and napalm for napalm."

On August 20, 1971, the leaders of Egypt, Syria and Libya signed a constitution calling for a loose Federation of Arab Republics; the federation was approved by referendums in each country on September 1, 1971. Egypt discarded the name, United Arab Republic, adopted at the time of the first union with Syria in 1958, and now uses the name, Arab Republic of Egypt.

On September 11, Egyptian voters overwhelmingly (99.98 per cent) approved a new constitution. There are provisions safeguarding individual rights, broadening the authority of the legislature—known as the People's Assembly—and calling for the modernization of Egyptian society and an end to endemic bureaucratism. But radical reforms have thus far been more a matter of publicity than substance. Similarly, the revamping of the A.S.U. may prove easier to achieve on paper than in the villages and cities.

Fatalism is widespread, and not merely with respect to prospects for an end to the Middle East conflict. It is almost 20 years since the army overthrew the monarchy and propelled Nasser into political prominence. The revolutionary élan which existed for a brief time in the late 1950's and early 1960's has waned. Nowhere is this more evident than in the moribund Arab Socialist Union, the political organization supposedly responsible for political mobilization and for generating re-

form and efficiency. From all indications, it is political only on paper; primarily it is an administrative and bureaucratic arm of the leadership that is centered in the military and government. Its trademark has been rhetoric, not reform, manipulation, not mobilization.

The A.S.U. has more than seven million "members," but less than 100 full-time, salaried party organizers. For most, membership is collective. A factory worker, finding that part of his salary had been withheld, asked why, and was told that it was his dues as a member of the A.S.U. "But I never joined," he protested, not understanding that "membership" was automatic and all-inclusive for the factory's workers. In the villages, an individual joins to acquire prestige: his status is enhanced by virtue of membership. In an environment where adaptation is the key to a better life, many A.S.U. officials have been known more for their self-aggrandizement than for their dedication to reform.

The A.S.U. has gone through reformist periods in the recent past without any basic changes in its mode of operation. Sadat himself admitted that in 1968 the A.S.U. elections, which Nasser had announced to revitalize the organization and strengthen the home front in the fight against Israel, were rigged. In the wake of Nasser's death, Abdel Mohsen Abul Nur, the Secretary-General, reorganized the Secretariat and promised a new purposefulness. In early 1971, members of the A.S.U.'s Higher Executive Committee often spoke about the steps that were being taken to forge political unity and action. The results were very much like those achieved by the monkey in the Krylov fable who set out to organize the barnyard animals into a symphony orchestra: no matter how he distributed the instruments, the sounds never produced music.

Under Nasser, the heads of the 25 governorates (provinces) into which Egypt is subdivided were invariably former military and police officers who were appointed on the basis of loyalty and connections rather than ability or knowledge of a district's problems. Most of the governors have been removed since the May purges, presumably because

they were protégés of Aly Sabry and the other imprisoned ministers; their replacements are, of course, pro-Sadat. The unknown factor is their ability. In a land where the past is an integral dimension of the present, no drastic departure from the traditional pattern of politics is likely.

There have been changes and some improvements, but there has not been any genuine social, economic or political revolution. A "new class" has entrenched itself in power during the past 19 years, and it is more interested in privilege than in production. One Egyptian, returning after a prolonged absence, asked a shoeshine boy at the pier how his life was under socialism. The boy shrugged and looked at the officials getting into a new Mercedes: "Socialism is for 'Them.'"

### THE SOVIET FACTOR

Egyptian dependence on the Soviet Union is total. Not only is the Egyptian army completely dependent upon Soviet weapons, spare parts, supplies and advisers, but Egypt's economy is increasingly enmeshed with that of the Soviet bloc. A long-term economic agreement was signed in Moscow on March 16, 1971, calling for Soviet loans of more than \$400 million over the next five years for a variety of projects: the electrification of rural areas, the reclamation of several hundred thousand acres of land from the desert, the construction of storage silos and two cement factories, and the expansion of the Helwan steel plant from 200,000 tons a year to 1.5 million tons in 1977. The *de facto* military alliance epitomized by the May 27, 1971, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation has already been mentioned. Clearly, Moscow is settling in for the long haul.

Egyptians know that their economy is in hock to the Soviet Union but shrug this off with resignation, regret and a humor born of the realization that they have no other choice. They tell the following joke. When Podgorny came to inaugurate the completion of the Aswan High Dam in January, 1971, he demanded to see Nasser. The Egyptians were embarrassed and explained that this was impossible, it being against their religion to ex-

hume the body or reopen the tomb. But so insistent was Podgorny that they finally relented, reopened the tomb, and allowed him to enter. Five minutes passed, ten, thirty, an hour. Curious and concerned, the Egyptian leaders went in and found Podgorny busily putting Nasser's thumb print on hundreds of old I.O.U.'s.

Thus far, the Soviets have been generous. Their presence is growing, not merely in the military and economic spheres but in the artistic (ballet and music) and scientific fields as well. (According to some reports, Egyptian performers are chaffing under the regimen of orthodox fare prescribed by the Soviet supervisors.) But although lavish with arms and equipment, Moscow still shies away from providing the abundance of offensive weaponry necessary for a forced crossing of the Suez Canal or for carrying the war to Israeli territory. How much longer the Soviets can keep the Egyptian military on a tight rein without engendering a bitterness that would jeopardize the long-term ties the Soviets are trying to cultivate is a much debated question.

The Soviets, despite their vast assistance, are not popular. Most Egyptians are anti-Communists, particularly on religious grounds. And being a friendly, gregarious, urbane people, they cannot fathom the reserve maintained by the resident Soviet diplomats and technicians, who do not mingle, except at the official level, who keep to themselves, even playing volleyball at the fashionable Gezira Sporting Club only with other Soviet or East European officials and who, deservedly or not, have a reputation for being tight-fisted with money, which appalls the ease-loving, free-spending Egyptian. The average Russian remains very much a Sphinx to the Egyptian, who refers to the Russian as "the unsmiling one." As yet, the Soviets have not succeeded in penetrating deeply into Egyptian society or culture.

Now that Sadat has consolidated his political position, he may occupy himself with outmaneuvering his opponents and cultivating his image at home and abroad, and deal only perfunctorily with Egypt's pressing problems; or he may redirect Egypt's energies inward

and try to revive the thrust toward secularism and modernity. This latter course seems the less likely for two reasons.

First, Sadat is a devout Muslim, reputed to have good relations with conservative Islamic circles, including the Muslim Brotherhood, a militant, fundamentalist Muslim movement which Nasser suppressed and drove underground. If Sadat wants to improve Egypt's system of higher education, he will weaken the hold of religious orthodoxy—something he has been loathe to do.

Second, though the military buildup is taxing the economy to the utmost, Sadat cannot readily divert defense expenditures to the civilian sector without alienating the military, to whom he is beholden. Thus, pressures may intensify either to settle with Israel or to get on with the fighting, not just to freeze the status quo along the canal. It is possible that there is a group of young colonels and majors plotting to depose Sadat, as Nasser and Sadat and others deposed Farouk in 1952. Or the army might urge a resumption of hostilities, creating pressures Sadat may not be able to resist—indeed, pressures he may seize on as an alternative to the monumental challenge of internal transformation.

The root of Egypt's problem goes deep: it is the absence of a sense of commitment capable of energizing the youth, revitalizing the bureaucracy and stimulating productivity and production. What is said and written for internal public consumption has little relation to what people think and discuss in private, or to what actually shapes their behavior. The country suffers from an absence of meaningful reforms. The creation of a modernizing, viable political system is still very far in Egypt's future.

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## Jordan in Turmoil

BY HARRY N. HOWARD

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THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM of Jordan, it would appear, has gone from one crisis to another in recent years, particularly since the blitzkrieg of June, 1967. The crisis is partly one of identity, not unlike that in other Middle Eastern states, although there are nuances very peculiar to Jordan, involving both internal and external security problems, centering on the consequences of the June, 1967, conflict. It would be difficult, indeed, to attempt to prophesy the ending of the Jordanian story.

For perspective, it may be useful to point out that Jordan has faced critical problems since her foundation, which goes back to World War I, and more particularly to the establishment of the British mandate over the Emirate of Transjordan in 1922, separate from the mandate in Palestine, in which a "national home for the Jewish people" was to be established.<sup>1</sup> With the end of the British mandate, the former Emirate, on May 25, 1946, became the independent Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan, which continued in a special treaty relationship with the United Kingdom until its termination, by mutual agreement, on February 13, 1957. Jordan participated in the conflict against Israel,

when the independence of that state was proclaimed on May 14, 1948, immediately following the termination of the British mandate in Palestine. Her western demarcation lines with Israel were established in the Jordanian-Israeli armistice of April 3, 1949. Formal annexation of the West Bank of the Jordan River, along with East Jerusalem (the Old City) was proclaimed in 1950, and the name of the state was changed to The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Jordan took part in the June, 1967, conflict as an ally of the United Arab Republic (the Arab Republic of Egypt) and, as a result of her humiliating defeat, she lost both the West Bank of the Jordan and East Jerusalem to Israel.

The peculiar crisis in Jordan centers around this situation. The failure to achieve any kind of peaceful adjustment between Israel and the neighboring Arab states and the development of a distinct Palestinian national consciousness appear to be the primary elements contributing to the continued unstable security problem along the Jordan-Israel cease-fire lines and to the persistent insecurity within Jordan.

Part of the current difficulty in Jordan lies in the character of the population, about 90 per cent of which is Arabic and Muslim. The population (January, 1972) is estimated at some 2,300,000, including more than 700,000 refugees and displaced persons on the East Bank of the Jordan and 245,000 refugees

<sup>1</sup> For background see American University, Foreign Area Studies, *Area Handbook on Jordan* (Washington, D.C., U.S.G.P.O., 1969), U. S. Department of Labor, *Labor Law and Practice in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, B.L.S. Report No. 322 (Washington, U.S.G.P.O., 1967), Norman F. Howard, "The Commando State," *Current History*, January, 1970, pp. 16-20, 49.



on the West Bank. Some two-thirds of the total population are Palestinians, and one-third are refugees. Immediately after the tragic events of 1967, East Jordan had to meet the problem of the influx of more than 245,000 refugees, one-half of whom were Palestinian refugees already registered with UNRWA.<sup>2</sup> The population is 44 per cent urban, 50 per cent rural, and about 6 per cent nomadic or semi-nomadic. The average density of 40 persons per square mile increases to 800 in the northwestern part of the country. Literacy is now estimated at about 46 per cent.

### THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY

As late as 1958, during an earlier crisis in the Middle East, when the fate of both Lebanon and Jordan seemed in play, Jordan was considered by many observers to have as little economic as political future. There were very few basic economic resources, no oil and very little industry, and relatively few hotels to accommodate tourists, with the exception of a few in East Jerusalem, Amman, Jericho and the Dead Sea area. Agricultural production was based largely on uncertain rainfall. There was a large degree of underemployment and unemployment.

Yet prior to the June, 1967, conflict, the Jordanian economy showed surprising growth at an annual rate of some 9 to 10 per cent. Through effective use of Jordan's own very meager economic resources and of effective foreign assistance, largely from the American AID program, the Gross National Product in Jordan rose from \$161,840,000 in 1954 to

\$246,400,000 in 1958, and jumped to some \$575,000,000 by 1967, when the per capita GNP totaled some \$250.00.<sup>3</sup> In a general economic expansion, farmland in the Jordan Valley was irrigated (the East Ghor Canal, after 1959, for example), light industries were developed significantly, potash was to be taken from the Dead Sea, phosphate deposits were to be developed for export abroad, and tourist income was to be increased through the development of better facilities. There were some expectations that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, with all its economic limitations, would reach the "take-off stage" by the middle of the 1970's.

The economic impact of the June, 1967, conflict appears to have been little short of catastrophic, even if it did not destroy the vision of Jordanian planners.<sup>4</sup> Jordan suffered the loss of the West Bank of the Jordan River—the Jordan Valley—which produced about 40 per cent of her GNP. She also lost substantially all of her tourist earnings (the Jerusalem area). Moreover, Jordan lost a substantial proportion of her productive population and had to meet the additional burden of at least 245,000 new refugees and displaced persons on the East Bank.

Within a year, however, the country appeared to have made a rather remarkable recovery from her difficulties, thanks in part to assistance and subventions from oil-rich Arab countries (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya), which provided emergency grants of some \$55,000,000 and an annual subvention of some \$112,000,000. Initially, employment and demand were maintained through heavy government expenditures which had been made possible by the large subventions. Both agriculture and industry showed some improvement, with the exception of the Jordan Valley, where continued fighting disrupted more normal economic pursuits. Jordan's exports of fruits and vegetables and phosphate totaled some \$40,000,000 in 1968, while imports of petroleum, textiles, capital goods, automobiles and foodstuffs totaled some \$159,000,000. The GNP reached some \$523,622,830 in 1968—an astounding figure when one considers the political situation in the

<sup>2</sup> See especially UNRWA, *Emergency 1967* (Beirut, 1967); *UNRWA 1969-70* (Beirut, 1970) for basic summary data. See also the *UNRWA Annual Reports, 1967-1971*, in U.N. Docs. A/6713, 7213, 7614, 8013, 8413. During 1948-1971, it may be estimated that Jordan contributed some \$45,541,476 in direct assistance to the refugees (goods, services, and cash), in addition to \$2,529,105 to the UNRPR and UNRWA, or a total of some \$48,070,581.

<sup>3</sup> For summary see Richard J. Ward, "Jordan in a Turbulent World: Its Prospects," in *Nonaligned Third World Annual* (St. Louis: 1970), pp. 149-158.

<sup>4</sup> For a contrary view see E. Kanovsky, "The Economic Aftermath of the Six Day War," Pt. I, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring, 1968), pp. 278-296.

country at that time. In 1969, the GNP was estimated at some \$646,800,000, but it dropped by some 12 per cent to \$568,400,000 in 1970, following the tragic events of September.<sup>5</sup>

Possibilities for the future economic development of Jordan remained, but they rested on a number of assumptions and prospects. One of these, of course, was the possibility of a peaceful adjustment with Israel, with all that this might entail in the realm of direct communications with the Mediterranean through a free port. Still another was the regaining of the fertile Jordan Valley and a sharing of income from the tourist trade, especially in the Jerusalem area. A third was the prospect of promoting technical and higher education within Jordan, looking toward the more rational and constructive employment of her people. All this raised questions about Jordan's foreign and domestic policies.

#### JORDAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

From the beginning of her independence, for perhaps obvious reasons, Jordan has pursued a pro-Western foreign policy, and there have been close relations between Jordan and the United Kingdom and the United States. There has been no inclination on the part of the government to look toward the Soviet Union, with which relations were established only in 1963, although there were some changes in policy relative to the U.S.S.R. in the wake of the June, 1967, conflict. Nevertheless, King Hussein visited Moscow for the first time in early October, 1967, and the

U.S.S.R. was believed to have offered Jordan both economic and military assistance. The government of Jordan was grateful to the U.S.S.R. for denouncing Israel's "aggression," and looked forward to strong and permanent relations with the Soviet Union. But while there was a desire for strengthened cultural and scientific ties, King Hussein preferred to rely on the United States for arms. He continued to resist pressures to become a Soviet military client, as the Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria had done.

Over the years, and especially after 1957, the United States has helped to maintain the independence and integrity of Jordan through economic, military and diplomatic support, although there were some uncertainties in the period immediately following the June, 1967, conflict. It was not until February, 1968, that military assistance was renewed. Between 1952 and 1970, the United States provided Jordan with more than \$500 million in economic and some \$200 million in military assistance. Indeed, Jordan appears to have ranked immediately after Israel in per capita American economic assistance. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was much concerned with a possible threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Jordan during 1957-1958, whether from without or from within and, on April 24, 1957, he found that "the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East was vital to the national interest of the United States and to world peace."<sup>6</sup> Since 1967, official United States policy has been oriented toward securing an equitable settlement of issues arising from the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the conclusion of King Hussein's last visit to the United States in April, 1969, a joint statement emphasized the long-standing support of the United States "for the political independence and territorial integrity of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan." There have, nevertheless, been lingering doubts as to the consistency of the officially expressed United States position.<sup>7</sup>

Jordan, of course, never recognized Israel, whatever the "moderation" of her policy as compared with that of some of the other Arab

<sup>5</sup> Official Israeli sources estimated that output in the occupied territories rose by 20 per cent in 1969 and 14 per cent in 1970. Israel pumped some 40,000,000 Israeli pounds into the area in 1969 and 1970; the area had a visible trade with Israel in the amount of 220,000,000 Israeli pounds. Exports to Jordan in 1970 amounted to some 60,000,000 Israeli pounds.

<sup>6</sup> Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents* 1957, pp. 1015-1028; Muhammad Khalil, *The Arab States and the Arab League: A Documentary Record* (Beirut: Khayats, 1962), II, 390-395; *The New York Times*, April 25, 1957.

<sup>7</sup> For a general survey of American interest and policy, see John S. Badeau, *The American Approach to the Arab World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).

States. A major objective of her foreign policy has been the recovery both of the West Bank of the Jordan River and of East Jerusalem, occupied by Israel since June, 1967. She has consistently supported implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, stressed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, the need to work for a lasting peace, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories, and the right of all to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. Little progress appears to have been made in that direction, however.<sup>8</sup> Jordan followed the U.A.R. (July 23) on July 26 in accepting the cease-fire proposals which United States Secretary of State William P. Rogers had set forth on June 19, 1970. Israel reluctantly accepted formally only on August 4, and the cease-fire entered into force on August 7. One of the implicit conditions of the proposed settlement was that Jordan would have to control the activities of guerrilla organizations on her soil. Jordanian acceptance of the cease-fire, in some respects, triggered further internal conflict, which had widespread impact in the Middle East. For example, on July 31, 1970, Yasir Arafat declared that the Palestine Liberation Organization (*Fateh*) was dedicated to the liberation of all Palestine and, therefore, to the rejection of the American proposal and all other compromise solutions of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Jordan's problems of national unity and political independence in many ways depend on her relations with other states of the Arab world, and especially with Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Republic of Egypt.<sup>9</sup> Relations with the so-called progressive, socialist Arab states have been tenuous at best. Following the Khartoum Conference of August-September, 1967, Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia agreed to subsidize Jordan—otherwise her very existence would be in jeopardy—in the amount of some \$112,000,000 per annum,

although Libya and Kuwait ceased to do so after September, 1970, while the Saudi subsidy of \$41,000,000 continued.

### THE CRISIS IN 1970-1971

American interest in the political independence and territorial integrity of Jordan and concern with maintenance of a kind of balance in looking toward peaceful adjustment of the Arab-Israeli conflict undoubtedly animated United States policy during the critical period of 1970-1971. That there was a possible threat to stability—to the processes of orderly development and change—seemed obvious to those in authority. It will be recalled that on September 1, 1970, there was an abortive attempt to assassinate King Hussein. Fighting broke out once more between Jordanian forces and Arab Palestinian commandos in Amman—the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.-L.P.). Despite a call from the Arab League Council, the fighting continued during September 9-15, 1970, when an agreement was achieved by the army and the Palestinian guerrilla leaders which called for the withdrawal of all forces from Amman, the capital. A military government and martial law were proclaimed the next day. As fighting continued in Amman and the Irbid area, despite the cease-fire proclaimed by the King, there were reports on September 20 that Syrian armored forces and heavy artillery had crossed into Jordan.

Meanwhile, the United States became directly involved in the much complicated situation in Jordan when renewed fighting broke out in September between fedayeen elements and government forces. The confrontation was direct both in principle and in action, with the guerrillas insisting on their right to act independently of the government against Israel, and the government standing on the principles of "law and order" to meet the challenge to its authority. As the United States government, rightly or wrongly, saw the issue, the crisis occurred when the government of Jordan decided to reestablish full control of Amman in the face of serious

<sup>8</sup> For a balanced discussion see American Friends Service Committee, *Search for Peace in the Middle East* (Philadelphia: A.F.S.C., 1970).

<sup>9</sup> See Malcolm H. Kerr, *Regional Arab Politics and the Conflict with Israel* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1969), RM-5966-FF.

fedayeen inroads.<sup>10</sup> The United States considered the situation in Jordan as "the gravest threat to world peace since the administration came into office." With the Soviet Union "so deeply involved in the military operations of the United Arab Republic [the Arab Republic of Egypt], and with firm United States support of the survival of Israel, the risk of great power confrontation would have been real indeed." The Nixon administration felt that it had "no responsible choice but to prevent events from running away with the ability to control them." The United States, therefore, took a firm stand against Syrian intervention and acted, it was said, to stabilize, "but not to threaten, to discourage irresponsibility without accelerating the momentum of crisis." When a Syrian tank force, disguised as Palestinian, crossed into Jordan and took up positions on September 18, it was promptly attacked, only to return the next day. The United States warned the U.S.S.R. "of the serious consequences which could arise if Syria did not withdraw." It also dispatched the United States Sixth Fleet—in the Mediterranean since the end of World War II—and alerted airborne troops, while Israel began "precautionary military deployments." With a Syrian withdrawal, "the danger of a serious international confrontation dimmed."

President Richard Nixon authorized \$5 million in emergency aid and \$5 million in rehabilitation assistance to Jordan, in view of

the severe crisis in the fall of 1970. In a message to the Congress on November 18, 1970, the President requested the Congress to provide \$30 million toward meeting Jordan's problems and declared that

a stable and viable Jordan is essential if that nation is to make a positive contribution toward working out an enduring peace settlement which would serve the interests of all nations in the Middle East. The Jordanian government has recently demonstrated its determination and capacity to resist aggression by forces which oppose a peace settlement and threaten to weaken the stability of that country.

While Jordan had hitherto paid for her military equipment, she could not now meet the new military burden, and had been forced to ask for assistance.<sup>11</sup>

Secretary of State William Rogers sounded much the same note in a statement of December 10, 1970,<sup>12</sup> when he observed that the United States had not used its military forces directly in the Middle East crisis, the only American military units in the area being aboard units of the United States Sixth Fleet. In a broader context he pointed out that, although a negotiated settlement had not been achieved, a cease-fire had come into being on August 7, and he hoped negotiations would be pursued and fighting not renewed. An essential element in moving toward negotiations was the maintenance of a "military balance"—a euphemism for Israeli military superiority—although that had been threatened by the influx of Soviet arms. Secretary Rogers believed in the Jordanian desire for peace, and considered stability within Jordan important to the prospects for peace in the area. He also observed that the government of Jordan had just survived "a concerted effort to overthrow it on the part of internal and external forces opposed to a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict." But much military equipment had been destroyed and the economy had been badly disrupted—hence the necessity of United States economic assistance.

## GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Whether the situation within Jordan would move toward a greater degree of stability

<sup>10</sup> Department of State, *United States Foreign Policy, 1969–70: A Report of the Secretary of State* (Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1971), pp. 80–82; U. S. *Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace: A Report to the Congress By Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 25, 1971* (Washington, D.C.: 1971), pp. 127–128. For the possibility of joint Israeli-United States action, see *The New York Times*, October 8, 1970. These events were preceded by the hijacking of three airliners in Jordan during September 7–29, 1970, by fedayeen elements. Although there was talk of such, there are no formal American commitments in the area of the Arab-Israeli conflict. See *National Commitments*. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 91–129, pp. 26–27; H. N. Howard, "The U. S. in the Middle East Today," *Current History*, July, 1969, pp. 36–41.

<sup>11</sup> *United States Foreign Policy, 1969–1970*, p. 477.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 429.



during 1970–1971 and the years to come, of course, remained to be seen, and it was a matter of serious concern, not merely within the confines of that troubled country but elsewhere as well. The Arab foreign ministers sought to mediate between the fedayeen and the government of Jordan and on September 22, 1970, a cease-fire was announced. A further agreement was concluded on October 13, 1970, although sporadic fighting continued throughout the rest of 1970 and into 1971. During a period of six weeks in the late summer and fall of 1970 there were three Cabinets until, on October 28, Wasfi el-Tal became Prime Minister.\* On November 9, a peace agreement between the Government and the guerrilla leaders went into effect, calling once more for the withdrawal of forces from the capital. Another new agreement was signed on December 15, 1970.

Suffice it to say, perhaps, that agreement followed broken agreement in seemingly endless “negotiations.” But by July, 1971, the Jordanian army seemed virtually to have eliminated the guerrilla presence from Jordan, and the movement became very seriously fragmented, with the result that it appeared to have become neutralized as an effective armed guerrilla force, although the national movement of which the guerrillas were a fundamental expression remained. By the fall of 1971, there were increasing signs of division and turmoil in the guerrilla ranks both within Jordan and outside, in Syria and Lebanon. There were serious differences between Yasir Arafat, leader of the P.L.O. (Fateh) and George Habash, of the P.F.L.P.,

to say nothing of others.<sup>13</sup> Early in October, 1971, there was an attempt on the life of Arafat. There was speculation that the Arafat leadership was at issue in the fedayeen movement following the guerrilla defeat in Jordan during the September, 1970, disturbances, and his prestige evidently sank to a new low after the virtual elimination of the guerrillas by the Jordanian army in July, 1971. A serious conflict appeared to have developed in September, 1971, when Arafat seemed to have been disposed toward reconciliation with the Jordanian government and agreed to send a delegation to Jidda to meet with representatives of King Hussein at a reconciliation conference under Saudi and Egyptian sponsorship. Little or nothing appeared to come from these month-long meetings. Nevertheless, Arafat, who helped organize the P.L.O. in 1964–1965 and emerged into the top leadership of the Palestinian national movement after the June, 1967, conflict, remained as the Fateh leader and chairman of the P.L.O., which linked all commando groups. He also remained as the supreme commander of the P.L.A., the regular military force of the Palestinian national movement.<sup>14</sup>

Meanwhile, King Hussein took steps in the direction of bringing his people more closely and directly into support of his regime. While the Jordanian political system remained a constitutional monarchy and political parties had never been officially recognized, on September 7, 1971, the King announced the establishment of the Jordanian National Union. The new National Union, reminiscent of other attempts at “guided democracy,” which included all the people of Jordan, aimed at organizing the country’s resources and set forth the general principles  
(Continued on page 49)

<sup>13</sup> See Hisham Sharabi, *Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1970); Michael Hudson, “The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement; Its Significance in the Middle East Crisis,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer, 1969), pp. 291–307. See also Yusif A. Sayigh, *Towards Peace in Palestine* (Beirut: 1970); *The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fateh* (Beirut: 1970); *The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Fateh, Dialogue with Fateh* (Beirut: 1970); *The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Fateh, Revolution until Victory* (Beirut).

<sup>14</sup> *The New York Times*, September 7, 24, October 10, 1971.

\* *Ed. Note:* Wasfi el-Tal was assassinated in Cairo on November 28, 1971; Ahmed al-Lawzi succeeded him.

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*"A durable peace . . . will probably elude the Lebanese and other Arab peoples until a just solution of the problems of the Palestinian refugees causes the Arab guerrilla movement . . . to cease military operations and cooperate in the building of a Palestinian state."*

## Lebanon: The Politics of Survival

BY JOHN B. WOLF

*Director, Center for Research on Problems of National  
Integration and Stabilization*

UPON GAINING HER INDEPENDENCE from France in 1943, Lebanon based her political system upon an unwritten agreement (called the National Pact) which provided for a sectarian division of offices and benefits between her Christian and Muslim communities. Although regarded only as an expedient political compromise, the pact allowed the Lebanese to cooperate in a joint effort to build a state. Lebanon's political elite knows that the replacement of "confessional politics" with a written constitution, containing religious guarantees in its preamble, is ill-advised, because in the past both Christians and Muslims have been suspicious of all attempts to revise their pact and have organized their communities for the purpose of militant action to be undertaken against those who try.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, Lebanon's demography, divided almost equally between Christians and Muslims, is considered the primary threat to the country's existence as an independent entity. However, it is also somewhat responsible for the stabilization of Lebanese politics because both religious groups are aware that each is unable to impose its will upon the other and

that a civil war would shatter the relatively prosperous economy of their country, whose largesse is shared by all of its citizens and which some people call "The Switzerland of the Middle East."

In 1958, however, the Lebanese had not yet learned this lesson, and some of them have since forgotten it. That year, civil war erupted as a consequence of internal political manipulations bent on amending the National Pact, which caused agitators from both religious communities to fan the flames of sectarian discord. But the communal violence ended abruptly as an expeditionary force of United States Marines, without firing "a shot in anger," landed on a beach near Beirut. However, both communities bled profusely. American military intervention was subject to interpretation by some as a move to establish Christian hegemony, whereas others regarded it as an effort to preserve the national integrity of Lebanon by preventing the absorption of Christians against their will into an enlarged Muslim Syria. The prompt withdrawal of the American landing force prevented threats of intervention by the socialist Arab states (supported by the Soviet Union) from becoming anything more than words.<sup>2</sup>

After the end of violence in 1958, Lebanese politicians seemed determined to prevent sectarian discord from causing their country's sovereignty to be compromised again. Their efforts have not always been successful, how-

<sup>1</sup> "Manifesto of the United National Front issued on 1 April 1957," as reproduced in M. S. Agivani, *The Lebanese Crisis 1958* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 29-33.

<sup>2</sup> Jack Shulimson, *Marines In Lebanon 1958* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1966).

ever, since religious-based violence, induced by external factors beyond the control of Lebanese politicians and by chance, continues to occur. It is not easy for states with a tradition of communal discord caused by centuries of religious intolerance to erase hatred and distrust; and national integration is often equated by the masses with religious compromise. Currently, Northern Ireland, Chad, Sudan, the Philippines and other states are confronted with internal disturbances traceable to religious grievances that articulate spokesmen have translated into a popular cause for an insurgent movement that seeks to destroy or modify an existing political system.<sup>3</sup>

The best possible course for Lebanese politics seems to be a route which avoids the sectarian issue; other paths would wind through a sea of violence caused by the real or imagined convictions of both Christians and Muslims, who fear that reprisals would be undertaken against them if their opponents gained political ascendancy. Consequently, Lebanon clings to a 1932 French-conducted census as the basis for her distribution of political offices in accordance with the National Pact. This census indicated that a slight majority of Lebanese were Christians, although it is widely believed that Muslims are now in the majority. The National Pact would be subject to revision if an official census confirmed a Muslim majority, and an internal crisis of the first magnitude would be engendered if Muslims were given political control in accordance with a revised pact based on the new census.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, mindful of the lessons they learned in the 1958 Civil War and acting in accord-

ance with the provisions of the National Pact, Christians try to avoid pushing Lebanon too close to the West and Muslims refrain from seeking unity with any Arab state. Both generally accept the fact that an independent and sovereign Lebanon within the Arab world is best for their mutual interests. Consequently, Lebanon did not participate in the Six Day War of 1967. Nothing resembling the "twilight war" that has been fought along Israel's borders with other Arab countries shattered the relative calm of the Lebanese-Israeli frontier until Israeli troops raided Beirut International Airport on December 28, 1968. The helicopter-borne Israelis, retaliating against Lebanon for her failure to suppress Lebanese-based Arab guerrilla groups whose members had hijacked an El Al airliner over Italy and assaulted another on the runway at Athens airport, provoked a political crisis that lasted almost two years. The raid became a "cause celebre" for the Palestinian Movement (e.g., Al Fateh, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and so on) who maintained offices in Beirut and whose spokesmen regarded moves by Lebanese security forces to quell guerrilla activity as an attempt to prevent the Palestinian refugees from regaining their homes and property.<sup>5</sup>

During the spring and summer of 1969, guerrilla raids against Israel from bases in southern Lebanon intensified, and the ineffective countermeasures undertaken by the Lebanese government against Al Fateh and the other commando groups gained for the Palestinian Resistance Movement the popular support of many Lebanese. The 25,000-man Lebanese army did not seem able to crush the guerrillas, and avoided a pitched battle with them because of a possible adverse impact upon Lebanon's stability, regardless of which side prevailed. This situation split the country between right-wing, mostly Christian groups, holding the view that the Arab guerrillas were a threat to the integrity of Lebanon, and left-wing groups that wanted a continuation of guerrilla activity against Israel from Lebanese bases regardless of the consequences. Right-wing leaders warned con-

<sup>3</sup> An excellent discussion of the problems of minorities in the Lebanese nation-building process is found in Michael W. Suleiman, *Political Parties In Lebanon* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 1-56. A general discussion of minorities is found in Albert H. Hourani, *Minorities In The Arab World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1947).

<sup>4</sup> "Lebanese Nationalism and Its Foundations: The Phalangist Viewpoint," by Pierre Gemayel in Kemal H. Karpat, *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 107-110.

<sup>5</sup> John B. Wolf, "Shadow on Lebanon," *Current History*, January, 1970, pp. 23-25.

stantly of a possible occupation of southern Lebanon by Israel unless guerrilla operations ceased, and they accused the government of negligence for its failure to find a solution to the guerrilla problem. Their remarks reminded all Lebanese that any active involvement on their part with guerrilla operations (e.g. intelligence gathering, provisioning, sanctuary) would cause Israel eventually to attack and destroy their homes and farms. These remarks were countered by left-wing spokesmen who implied that the danger of an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon was remote, as the major powers (e.g., the United States, the Soviet Union) would not tolerate such a move while they searched for a solution to the problems caused by the Israeli occupation of Arab territory during the Six Day War.<sup>6</sup>

### POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Also in the summer of 1969, Camille Chamoun, President of Lebanon during the 1958 Civil War and an articulate right-wing politician, was suspected by some Lebanese of trying to rally the Christian Phalange party to support his bid for the presidency in the 1970 elections. The possible combination of the Phalange, the always feared Lebanese engulfment in an upsurge of Arab nationalism, and Chamoun, suspected by some Lebanese of causing the 1958 United States intervention when he confused the pressure of Arab nationalism with the forces of international communism, was viewed by some observers as an additional threat to Lebanon's national integrity. At the time Chamoun seemed to be the person most likely to replace President Charles Helou, prevented by law from succeeding himself. Consequently, Lebanon was confronted with a political crisis caused on the one hand by the continuing attacks of Lebanese-based guerrillas against Israel, which its army was unable to check, and a possible attempt by Chamoun to regain the presidency, which might infuriate his oppon-

ents and possibly cause a renewal of civil war.

On August 11, 1969, the Israelis launched the first of a series of attacks against guerrilla bases in southern Lebanon from which commando raids were being launched against settlements in Israel's northeastern corner. The strategy behind these raids assumed that a major Middle East crisis would be avoided if Israeli troops attacked in obvious self-defense and remained in Lebanon for but a few hours. The strategy also calculated that some Lebanese politicians, while publicly demanding sanctions by the United Nations against Israel, might privately recognize the merits of having the guerrillas smashed without themselves being held responsible. It was recognized that Lebanon's internal stability could be enhanced if its army appeared to be in the position of defense of its homeland while its commanders were cautioned to avoid fire fights.<sup>7</sup> In January, 1970, however, right-wing opponents of General Bustani, the commander of the Lebanese armed forces and a Christian, accused him of "selling out" to the guerrillas in an attempt to gain popular support for his bid as a presidential candidate, and demanded that his army undertake a more active role against Israel. The previous November, General Bustani had met with Palestinian Resistance leaders in Cairo, and both sides agreed that the guerrillas could remain in Lebanon if they kept uniformed members of their bands out of towns, halted military training at Arab refugee camps, and refrained from turning funerals of dead compatriots into military demonstrations. The accusation leveled against the general, however, forced his resignation from the army, contributed to the erosion of his political influence among Christians and eliminated him as a possible presidential opponent of Chamoun, whom he opposed politically.

During the last week of January General Njaim, the new commander of the Lebanese armed forces, moved to end an outbreak of almost daily bombings in Beirut which began after commando groups accused the Lebanese government of violating the Cairo accords. But because suppression of the guerrillas was dangerous and probably impossible, a new

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>7</sup> Fred J. Khouri, "The Policy of Retaliation In Arab-Israeli Relations," *The Middle East Journal*, Autumn, 1966, pp. 438-442.



understanding was reached which gave the government the responsibility for setting up security posts outside refugee camps to handle civil problems while the guerrillas became responsible for all matters relating to the Palestine Revolution. Agreements concerning joint plans for fund raising and for guerrilla reentry into Lebanon after strikes against Israel were also worked out. Consequently, guerrilla leaders cautioned their followers to avoid clashes between themselves and Lebanese civilians. In April, 1970, the tension in Lebanon appeared to lessen and statements by the United States suggested that a United Nations Peacekeeping Force should be stationed along the Lebanese-Israeli border, and that Israeli reprisal raids were detrimental to Lebanon.

Later in April, however, the Arab guerrillas sensed that the American statements may have been a backhanded warning to the Israelis; therefore they unleashed a wave of attacks against Israel from bases located between Mount Hermon and the Hasbani River in south Lebanon. On May 12, Israel retaliated against them by mounting her biggest penetration into Lebanon since the 1948 war. This raid was a search and destroy mission whose objectives were six Lebanese villages believed to be harboring guerrillas. After these villages were encircled, the Israelis interrogated their occupants and seized arms caches. Although this operation was completed during the early morning hours of May 13, the Israelis commenced further military actions after local unit commanders were furnished with data on more arms caches and hideouts. After spending a total of 32 hours in Lebanon, the Israelis withdrew.

A critique of these operations by Israeli experts contained remarks which indicated that only a scorched earth operation of several days would rid southern Lebanon of the guerrillas and that guerrilla resistance was sometimes fierce but disorganized. Al Fateh's analysis differed from the Israeli view. It concluded that the Israelis were prevented from entering villages because 3,000 guerrillas stood their ground and repelled the invaders. President Helou, meanwhile, lauded the

heroism of the Lebanese army in defending its country from the Israeli attackers. Another account, however, mentioned that a Lebanese tank in a vital blocking position held its fire after Israelis informed its commander that they would not "fire unless fired upon."

Israeli retaliatory raids, however, did not halt guerrilla attacks against settlements in Israel. In late May, a guerrilla bazooka team scored a direct hit on an Israeli school bus near the Lebanese border and killed 11 of its passengers, most of them children. This incident was countered by a swift Israeli strike into Lebanon which failed to make contact with the guerrillas. But as the month of June progressed it was apparent that Lebanon had ceded sovereignty over a portion of her southern region to Israel; Israeli troops were on continuous patrols on both sides of the border, and the inhabitants of the region were under Israeli protection. A Lebanese report revealed that 22,853 persons had fled from frontier areas as a result of the continuing Israeli presence. It was not until the Israelis withdrew in July that the Lebanese began to return to their homes and farms. However, during the rest of July and most of August, life in south Lebanon remained tenuous. Guerrilla attacks and Israeli reprisals continued. Statistics issued by the Palestine Armed Struggle Command revealed a rapidly increasing level of operations against Israel during 1969 and the first six months of 1970. 3,900 operations were reported during 1969 alone as compared with about 1,500 for each of the years between 1965 and 1969.

### 1970 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

In August, the political situation in Lebanon changed abruptly. The favorable reaction of Egypt and Jordan to the Middle East Peace Plan, formulated by the United States, caused the guerrillas to marshal all their strength for action against Jordan's King Hussein, for the Palestinians could not accept any plan that gave about 80 per cent of their homeland to Israel. Thus, in September, 1970, the guerrillas revolted in Jordan; this relieved pressure on Lebanon because most of the Lebanese-based guerrilla units were

needed for the fight against the Jordanian army. The revolt in Jordan lasted seven days, during which time the King and his army inflicted heavy punishment on the guerrillas. The losses the guerrillas sustained in Jordan, when added to the casualties inflicted upon them by Israeli reprisals in Lebanon, made it difficult for them to continue extensive and regular operations against Israel.

As the guerrillas mobilized for the struggle in Jordan, centrist Lebanese politicians moved to maintain the sectarian balance jeopardized by Chamoun's presidential candidacy. On the morning of August 15, Chamoun formally declared his plans to run and joined Pierre Gemayel, Christian Phalangist leader, and Adnan Hakim, head of the Muslim Najjada party, in the presidential race. Unless a compromise candidate could be found, however, it appeared that the election might not permit a peaceable transition from the present administration to the next, because the Najjada party was determined to break the tradition of Christian presidents.<sup>8</sup> With Chamoun's candidacy unacceptable to some right-wing politicians, the Najjada appeared to have enough votes to win. But in the afternoon, the political balance shifted when Kamal Jumblatt, a Druze feudal leader and Minister of the Interior, authorized the Lebanese Communist party (L.C.P.) to operate freely; the balance moved further to the right on August 16 when the Arab Nationalist Movement, founded by commando chief George Habash, was legalized along with several other radical parties.

Announced publicly as measures to reinforce democratic liberties and freedom, these decisions caused a split in the left-wing camp by swelling its ranks with militant radicals, and enabled the right-wing to become a somewhat more cohesive bloc.<sup>9</sup> Shortly after the last decision was announced, Chamoun withdrew his candidacy and, along with two other right-wing strongmen, backed Suleiman Franjeh as a compromise candidate. Franjeh, an

unsuccessful candidate for the presidency in 1964, was a member of the centrist bloc in the Assembly and cool to the guerrilla movement, although he was expected to adhere to Lebanon's understanding with the commandos.

The elections of August 17, however, came within a wink of tearing the country apart. Franjeh failed to get the two-thirds majority required on the first ballot; a second ballot was declared invalid after 100 votes were found cast in a 99-seat house; and on the third ballot, Franjeh was elected by only one vote over Elias Sarkis, the head of Lebanon's Central Bank. Tempers flared on both sides when the one-vote margin was momentarily declared insufficient for election. Just when Lebanese democracy appeared to be on the verge of collapse, the Speaker reconsidered and declared Franjeh the winner. As President, Franjeh seemed to calculate that the guerrillas would step up their activity in Lebanon to show that they remained strong despite their defeat in Jordan. He moved, therefore, to gain some estimate of their remaining military power and political influence.

#### FRANJIEH'S ADMINISTRATION

In November, the guerrillas submitted to a government request to stop firing rockets into Israel from southern Lebanon, and reorganized their movement in an effort to bring about smoother relations with the country's leaders. In late November, however, the murder of a Lebanese militia commander, his pregnant wife, and his father, allegedly by guerrillas, spread horror throughout Lebanon and confirmed the suspicions of many Lebanese that the guerrillas were spreading disorder in their country. Popular support, vital for the conduct of guerrilla operations, shifted slowly toward the government's side.

*(Continued on page 49)*

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<sup>8</sup> Suleiman, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-213.

<sup>9</sup> Information on the Druze can be found in Philip K. Hitti, *The Origins of the Druze People and Religion* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928).

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*"The United States and Great Britain are relying on Iran to preserve Western interests in the Gulf, a hope which in turn depends on Iran's relationships with her Arab neighbors."*

## A Leadership Role for Iran in the Persian Gulf?

BY ANN T. SCHULZ

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NO ONE CAN AFFORD another South Arabia in the Persian Gulf." This statement, which appeared in an editorial in one of Iran's leading newspapers, expressed that country's growing anxiety over the revolutionary forces which had established themselves on the nearby Arabian peninsula. Policy-makers in Teheran regarded these forces as a threat to Iran's oil industry as well as to her internal political stability. These concerns loomed still larger as a result of Britain's promise to withdraw her military forces from the Gulf area by the end of 1971. The Iranian regime fully intends to fill this vacuum with its own improved military and economic capabilities. Until it is able to do so, however, the region will continue to be extremely volatile.

Although strident Arab nationalism and Britain's economic difficulties have precipitated her promised departure, continued access to the Persian Gulf is of major interest to the West and, more recently, to Japan. This interest stems from the Gulf's abundant and relatively inexpensive oil. Some recent

figures are illustrative of the Gulf's dominant position in oil production: one-fourth of the world's total daily consumption is produced by Gulf states and shipped through the Straits of Hormuz into the Indian Ocean; 60 per cent of the West's oil and 90 per cent of Japan's oil follow the same route. Little of the petroleum consumed by the United States originates in the Gulf, but American oil firms are heavily involved in its production.

The desire of both the oil-involved powers and of Iran to maintain the status quo within the Gulf area indicates at least a temporary convergence among their foreign policy objectives. The immediacy of these objectives is heightened by the recent intensification of Soviet and Chinese activity within the region. The Iranian King, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, often has been quoted as saying that if his country had had a choice, it would not have selected the Soviet Union as a neighbor. Yet the U.S.S.R.'s economic involvement with its southern neighbors has increased dramatically in recent years. And in 1970, the Soviet Union received permission from the Republic of South Yemen to land a contingent of marines on the island of Socotra opposite Aden in the Indian Ocean. Despite the current rapprochement between the U.S.S.R. and Iran, Teheran regards the expansion of Soviet forces with apprehension.<sup>1</sup>

China has only recently entered Gulf poli-

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<sup>1</sup> A basic and fairly recent discussion of the impact of the cold war on the Middle East is available in Walter Laquer's *The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, 1958-1968* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969); J. C. Hurwitz, ed., *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969).

tics. Within the past decade, diplomatic and material contacts have been established between China and Iraq and Kuwait, and Iran formally recognized the mainland government in September, 1971. China's trade with countries bordering the Gulf tripled between 1958 and 1966. China is reportedly providing aid to rebel forces in Oman as well as possible support for insurrectionists in Iran.<sup>2</sup>

### IRAN'S STAKE IN THE GULF

The Persian Gulf is an important economic asset to Iran in two ways—for its off-shore oil deposits and as a shipping lane. Iran has negotiated nine major off-shore concessions, in which the National Iranian Oil Company participates with foreign companies on a 50/50 basis. Seven of these concessions were granted as recently as the mid-1960's. Oil is a critical part of Iran's economy. Twenty-eight per cent of Iran's gross national product and almost 50 per cent of her public revenues come from oil.

While other Gulf littoral states are also heavily dependent upon the production of oil, they are not all equally dependent upon shipping it out of the Gulf to market. Saudi Arabia and Iraq use pipelines to transport their oil exports to the Mediterranean. A proposed pipeline linking Iran with the (Turkish) Mediterranean port of Iskenderun would diminish Iran's dependence upon free transit in the Gulf. But after 14 years of negotiations, the international oil consortium which handles much of Iran's production has been unwilling to guarantee sufficient quantities of oil for transport to make the line economically viable.

The Gulf also serves Iran as a shipping lane from the major commodity port of Khorramshahr, which lies on the Shatt al-Arab, the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Commodity exporters have discussed developing an alternative trade route to Europe via the Black Sea. But these plans have also failed to materialize.

The third source of Iranian interest in

Gulf affairs, in addition to oil production and trade, is the stability of the Pahlavi regime. Iran is not insulated, as the Shah well knows, from the kind of political violence which cost Imam Mohammad al-Badr his throne in Yemen (1962), overturned the hereditary regimes which preceded the Republic of South Yemen (1967) and currently consumes a major share of Oman's oil revenues.

The opponents of Oman's reformer-sultan, Qabus ibn-Said, claim that they intend to encourage peoples' revolutions all along the Arabian (Trucial) Coast as far north as the Straits of Hormuz. Along the Straits, Iran's south coast is only 35 miles from the Arabian peninsula. The proximity of revolutionary forces to the Shah's army there would make armed conflict difficult to avoid, particularly at such a strategic location.

While armed insurrection has spread northward around the Arabian coast, the Iraqi government, led by President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, is supporting the Omani guerrillas and Baathist party cells in the Sultanates of Bahrein and Abu Dhabi.

The Shah of Iran now publicly refers to Iraq's foreign policy as "neo-colonialist." He regards the Baghdad regime with open suspicion because of its relationships with these "liberation" groups.

The "Bakhtiar Affair" was also a major source of conflict between Iran and Iraq until 1970. During the summer of that year, an Iranian General, Teymour Bakhtiar, was shot and killed while on a "hunting expedition" in the Zagros Mountains which divide Iraq from Iran. Bakhtiar, who had become Teheran's military governor after Prime Minister Mossadegh was deposed in 1953, had been accused of treason by the Iranian regime and had fled Iran in the early 1960's. He spent the intervening years in Lebanon and Iraq trying to unify anti-monarchical forces.

Iran and Iraq have made many reciprocal accusations of internal interference in their border provinces. Spokesmen for the Iranian government claim that the predominantly Arab population in the western, oil-rich province of Khuzistan has been encouraged into opposition by fellow Arabs in Iraq. The

<sup>2</sup> *The Economist* is a comprehensive source of up-to-date information on external involvement in Persian Gulf affairs.



TABLE I: Military Expenditures of Major Gulf States: 1971\*

Country	Military Expenditures (millions of U.S.\$)	Military Expenditures per capita (U.S.\$)	Military Expenditures as % of GNP
Iran	1,023	34	9
Iraq	237	26	7
Saudia Arabia	383	52	9
Kuwait (1968)**	63	126	2.8

\* Compiled from *The Military Balance, 1971-72* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971).

\*\* 1971 Kuwait figures were not published in *The Military Balance*; those figures presented here are from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures* (Washington, D.C.: 1969).

Iraqi government, on its side, contends that Iranian arms have flowed westward across the border into the hands of Kurdish tribesmen. The Kurds have been sporadically pressing for a separate homeland (which would involve portions of Turkey and Iran as well as Iraq) throughout this century. In recent years, the "Kurdish question" has been more costly for the Iraqi regime than for Turkey or Iran, and now the tentative year-old resolution of disagreements between the Kurds and the Iraqi government has been threatened by the issue of who is to control the revenues from oil production in the tribal areas.

Almost three years ago, in April, 1969, Iran massed troops along her border with Iraq in an attempt to force a boundary change at the Shatt al-Arab river, which divides the two countries at the northern tip of the Gulf. A 1937 treaty specified that the low-water line on the eastern (Iranian) side of that river was to be the international boundary along most (although not all) of its length. It is more customary to specify the thalweg or deep-water mark for international boundaries, and Iran objected to the fact that the Iraqi government collected navigation tolls on shipping there. Iran expressed her desire to revise the treaty in 1961 and 1965. On April 19, 1969, the government of Iran declared the treaty "null and void." Three days later,

an Iranian freighter steamed out of Khorramshahr, escorted by naval and air contingents, to press its right to free navigation. The ship was not molested and a step toward an informal settlement was thereby taken.

Border problems have been characteristic of Iran's diplomatic history. During the last two centuries, the Gulf coast has been Iran's "Achilles heel." During most of this period, Muscat controlled the littoral areas on both sides of the Gulf near the Straits of Hormuz. The sultans' voyages around the Island of Hormuz served to reinforce the Arabs' sovereignty there. In 1794, Sayyed Sultan bin Ahmad, ruler of Muscat, formalized his position by leasing the city of Hormuz and nearby Bandar Abbas. And later, in the mid-nineteenth century, Muscat's Sultan Sa'id claimed Bandar Abbas on the basis of this historic precedent. But this time, the claim was unsuccessful, and historians state that it was advanced only on behalf of Britain—which went to war against Iran in 1856. Ten years later, by threatening Iran's Gulf coast, Britain forced Iranian troops to withdraw from Herat, an outpost regarded as a stepping stone to India.<sup>3</sup>

Even today, there is little contact between Teheran and Iran's southern provinces. Transportation and communications improvements in the southern Gulf areas have been given low priority in past development schemes. Maps drawn up by Plan Organization (Iran's economic development agency) of telephone, telecommunication and transportation networks within Iran show how isolated the southern provinces are. Only one

<sup>3</sup> John B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf: 1795-1880* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) is a good source book for Gulf politics in history. For historical insights into Iran's foreign policy, see Rouhollah Ramazane, *The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1966).

paved road stretches south from Kerman; it leads to Bandar Abbas on the Gulf Coast.

Neither the coastal towns adjacent to the Straits nor their hinterlands occupy a particularly important place in Iran's economy. Less than one-third of Iran's imports are channeled through Bandar Abbas, the largest port in the Hormuz area. The ports which handle Iran's oil exports are farther north, at the head of the Gulf. The position of the provinces themselves is suggested by an index of economic integration, computed from Plan Organization data. These data show the regions of Kerman, Bandar Abbas and Baluchestan (to the East) to be ninth, thirteenth and eighteenth, respectively, out of eighteen regions.

In summary, the Iranian government has two overriding objectives which are guiding its assertion of influence in the Persian Gulf. Both are related to the future of the Pahlavi monarchy. First, the Gulf's oil installations and shipments must be protected from possible disruption by indigenous Arab, Russian or Chinese actions. Second, the border areas along the Gulf must be secured against external support for armed insurrection. These two interests are intertwined because of Iran's present reliance upon Western markets for oil sales.

#### IRAN'S POTENTIAL INFLUENCE IN THE GULF

The United States and Great Britain are relying on Iran to preserve Western interests in the Gulf, a hope which in turn depends on Iran's relationships with her Arab neighbors. The prognosis for smooth relations in the future is not good; their tenor in the past has been erratic.<sup>4</sup>

Diplomatic relations, for example, are quickly broken and renewed. Even Iran and Iraq were able to lay aside the cudgel long enough to participate in joint oil negotiations

during the winter of 1971, and in recent years, Egypt has frequently sent high level emissaries to Teheran. Yet intermittently, Iran has publicly criticized both governments, and Egypt and Iraq have reciprocated. For this reason, evaluations of Iran's status in the Gulf should be based upon military and economic considerations as well as upon formal diplomatic behavior.

*Military Capabilities:* In the last three years, Iran has developed military airfields along the Gulf coast in Jask, Bushire and Bandar Abbas, and has enlarged the naval installation at Khorramshahr. A civilian air link was also created in September, 1971, between Teheran and Bandar Lengeh, the settlement on the Iranian mainland nearest to the offshore Straits islands which Iran has claimed.

The balance of power among the Gulf states themselves is more important now than it was when British military forces were involved directly in regional politics. Iran's military expenditures have risen dramatically as a result. Recent newspaper accounts indicate that the spending levels will continue to rise in the near future. These expenditures will increase Iran's foreign debts, especially those owed to London and Washington. Britain and the United States, for example, have contracted to underwrite the costs of military hardware, including 140 F4-D and F-4 jet fighters, to build a plant to retool 850 tanks, and to supply British-made tanks and naval craft.<sup>5</sup>

Even prior to these agreements, total Iranian defense expenditures and force levels stood higher than those of any other Gulf state and were the fourth highest in the Middle East. There is a serious question as to how long Iran will be able to maintain this growing military establishment. International debt obligations for arms purchase increased by 60 per cent between 1970 and 1971. The expanding military commitments could place severe constraints upon Iran's balance of payments. Recent estimates of Iran's defense borrowing levels indicate amounts higher than the total anticipated foreign borrowing for 1972.

Thus the cost of the Gulf arms race is high.

<sup>4</sup> Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: 1958-1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), discusses the difficulties which have plagued diplomatic relations among three Arab nations—Egypt, Syria and Iraq.

<sup>5</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) publishes information yearly on military spending and on arms agreements in *The Military Balance*.

Critics of the Shah accuse him of ignoring economic priorities in favor of military expansion. Although it is difficult to find consistent data, the figures which are available show that the Shah has opted for guns rather more than for butter. The Shah is gambling that success in the Gulf is a crucial key to domestic stability.

*Diplomatic relations:* In May, 1970, Iran renounced an outstanding claim to Bahrein, a claim which had been taken so seriously by the Iranian government that seats in the *Majles* (parliament) were reserved for future delegates from that island sultanate. The Bahrein dispute was very costly for Iran. During the spring of 1970, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were heavily involved in talks which led to an agreement to protect Bahrein from Iranian ambitions. At the same time, *Al-Anwar* in Beirut claimed to possess evidence that even Kuwait's integrity was not inviolate in the face of growing Persian irredentism. Whether or not this evidence was factual, Kuwait is reluctant to sign a mutual defense treaty with Iran to deter Iraqi threats to either.

Further south, the Trucial emirates' successful attempt at federation met a distinctly lukewarm response from Iran.<sup>6</sup> Public statements on the future of the emirates made by highly-placed Iranian politicians indicate that any earlier support in Iran for the federation now has disappeared. The Shah has built up useful personal relationships with several of the Trucial emirs themselves. From Iran's vantage point, a larger and more viable state on the opposite coast would be better able to withstand Iranian pressure. And in the short run, the more divided the Arab states are, the more Iran appears to be the logical successor to British supremacy.

Iran is not the only country which might be implicated in this apparent divide-and-rule gambit. Saudi Arabia and Iran reportedly have come to an understanding over mutual spheres of influence along the Trucial

coast which is reminiscent of the Russian/British division of Iran 60 years ago. Despite Radio Aden's accusations that Iran is hopeful of "splitting the Arab nation," Iran has not given up her claim to the three islands in the Straits. Iraq's Baath party organ, *Aisami*, stated that Iran's ambitions might transform the Gulf states "into another Palestine." This observation lacks perspective, but its implicit distinction between Arab and Persian is one which will continue to check Iran's advances in the Gulf.

In order to diffuse Arab opposition, the Shah has supported pan-Islamic conferences with enthusiasm. The establishment of a permanent secretariat by the Islamic Conference in the spring of 1970 was hailed by the Iranian press as an outstanding diplomatic achievement. At the same time, Iran is not hesitant to draw upon other external relationships to legitimize her aspirations in the Gulf. Ex-Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi recently returned to Teheran from CENTO talks in Ankara with the news that Iran had received full support for her Gulf policies from United States Secretary of State William Rogers, who was in attendance. But these non-Arab ties bear a price as well. They are further proof to the Arab states that Iran's loyalties often lie elsewhere.

Several recent events offset the apparent lack of trust between Iran and her Arab neighbors in the Gulf. A 1968 Saudi-Iranian agreement on the delineation of offshore boundaries was a singular example of the potential for creative international contacts among littoral Gulf states. In this treaty, Iran obtained Saudi recognition of her sovereignty over the island of al-Farsiyyah, which Iranian troops had occupied just before the agreement. A preliminary settlement, which Iran had refused to ratify in 1965, was overruled by the final contract, which extended Iran's jurisdiction beyond the median line of the Gulf at one point by reckoning mileage from Kharg Island rather than from the mainland. These gains were significant because they verified Iran's possession of newly discovered oil fields. The negotiations themselves illustrated not only the Gulf states'

<sup>6</sup> See Donald Hawley, *The Trucial States* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971), for background on politics in eastern Arabia.

ability to talk with one another when it was mutually advantageous to do so, but also Iran's ability to bargain successfully.

Acceptance of Iran's claim to at least one of the Straits islands is probably in the offing. The British government has refused to allow British Petroleum to begin exploiting the offshore concessions granted to it by Ras al-Khaimah, which also claims sovereignty over the Greater and Lesser Tumbs, until the issue of possession is settled. In June, 1971, the British Ambassador warned the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah that they should negotiate at that time rather than wait until Iran forced the issue.<sup>7</sup>

In November, 1971, Iran invaded Abu Musa and the Tumbs. The British Broadcasting Company announced an agreement with regard to Abu Musa permitting Iranian troops permanent occupation in return for economic aid to Sharjah, nominal ruler of Abu Musa.

*Trade:* Iran's economic transactions with her neighbors in the Gulf have increased rapidly over the past ten years. The absence of historical trade statistics probably exaggerates present trading levels. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries dhows plied the Gulf between Iran and Muscat. On the other hand, recent port improvements on both coasts and in air transport facilities obviously allow the handling of more goods than could be processed 100 years ago.

The fact that the growth in Iran's trade with other littoral states is recent makes it difficult to predict future trends. Although small absolutely, Iran's trade in the area is large relative to that of Saudi Arabia. There has been some minimal road construction between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates, but trade among these states is negligible. A rank ordering of Iran's major trading partners within the Middle East in 1966 shows that country to be far more Gulf-oriented than is Saudi Arabia.

The trade figures reflect the predominant position of oil in Saudi Arabia's economy to the exclusion of goods which might be exported to nearby markets. Iran has more diversified export possibilities. Iranian trade missions are touring the emirates frequently; almost every week newspapers report trade negotiations in process between Iran and the Gulf states.

Specifically, Iran's relatively large industrial establishment has allowed her to become an exporter of factories, equipment and technical skills, albeit on a very small scale. In April, 1971, it was announced that Iran had successfully bid upon the construction of a water treatment plant to be installed in Mecca. At the same time, Iran signed a \$2-million agreement to supply Egypt with buses. The expansion of Iran's Arya National Shipping Line has allowed that company to consider extending its present calls at Saudi Gulf ports to include ports on the Red Sea. Iran is participating in an oil refinery project in South Africa. And at the western end of the Muslim world, Iranian oil technicians have been training their counterparts in Algeria and Libya, relative newcomers to the world of oil production.

Despite these developments, Iran, like other Middle Eastern countries, is far more strongly tied economically to non-Middle Eastern trading partners than it is to markets in the Persian Gulf. Iran's economic stake in intra-Gulf trade is certainly minimal; further expansion awaits future industrial growth. Meanwhile, Iran's other Gulf interests are pressing and immediate.

A critical question for Western interests in the Persian Gulf is this: Can Iran serve as a core area for a stable international system in the Gulf and one in which Chinese and Russian influence will be minimized?<sup>8</sup> Based on the evidence presented above, our answer is a  
(Continued on page 50)

<sup>7</sup> *Arab Report and Record* details diplomatic events in most of the Middle East.

<sup>8</sup> See The Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Gulf: Implications of British Withdrawal* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1969), for a variety of opinions on the overall problem raised by this article.

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“... when the Baathist leaders regained power in the summer of 1968 they seemed to bring to their task a greater degree of sophistication and alertness.”

## Iraq under Baathist Rule

By ROY E. THOMAN

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THE ARAB BAATH SOCIALIST PARTY has guided Iraq's destiny since the *coup d'état* of July 17, 1968. Brigadier Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, representing the right-wing Baath, headed the movement and replaced the regime of President Abd al-Rahman Arif. Some years before this, the Baathists had briefly held power, from the revolution of February 8, 1963, which ended the rule of General Abd al-Karim Qasim, until November 18, 1963, when the military led by Abd al-Salam Arif and Tahir Yahya placed leading members of the Baath party under arrest and took over control.<sup>1</sup> This move resulted in the temporary eclipse of the Baath party. Although a detailed analysis of this earlier period of Baathist rule is beyond the scope of this study, it should be noted that lessons were learned, and when the Baathist leaders regained power in the summer of 1968 they seemed to bring to their task a greater degree of sophistication and alertness.

The Arab Baath Socialist party (A.B.S.P.) was founded on April 7, 1947, with its headquarters in Damascus. As the party is highly ideological in orientation, it is useful to examine certain basic beliefs, and then to note the impact of ideology on recent policy decisions.

General principles are laid down in the party's constitution. As part of the First Principle is found the postulate that “the

Arab homeland is an indivisible politico-economic unit. None of the Arab countries can attain to the full requisites of national life independent from the rest.” The Second Principle deals with the “personality of the Arab Nation” and states that “the freedom[s] of speech, assembly, [and] belief . . . [are] sacred and inviolable. . . .”

The constitution calls for a socialist approach: “The A.B.S.P. believes that socialism is a necessity stemming from the essence of Arab nationalism and reckons with it as the ideal system which permits the Arab people to make the fullest use of their possibilities, thus guaranteeing to the nation a steady rise in moral and material production and enduring fraternity among its ranks.” As to the relationship of the party to the masses, the declaration is made that “the A.B.S.P. is a popular party which believes that sovereignty belongs to the people, which alone is the source of every authority and leadership, and that the value of the state emanates from the state's reflection of the will of the masses, and that the sacredness of the state depends on the extent of the freedom by which it was elected by the masses. . . .” Lastly, for our purposes, is the call for gathering all Arabs together in our independent state.

Perhaps the best statement of contemporary ideology is to be found in the party program issued in 1965 by the Eighth National Conference of the A.B.S.P. This program, concerning itself with the task of defining the

<sup>1</sup> Majid Khadduri, *Republican Iraq* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 213.

role of the party *in power*, is of particular relevance considering that the Baathists actually did return to power in Iraq in 1968.

The basic function of the party, we learn, "is to bring about a revolutionary change in the entire social relations: political, economic and social."<sup>2</sup> The theory of the "leader-party" is expounded:

Here arises the great difference between what has come to be called one-party rule and the rule of the leader-party. Under the one-party system the party undertakes the change-over operation all by itself, whereas the leader-party depends on the masses and their organizations for effecting the change-over operation under its leadership.

... [T]he party grants to these masses and their organizations freedom of action and freedom of movement, though, of course, *within the terms of social progress which the party comprehends*, lest the maladies of the *ancient regime* find their way into the new society which the party seeks to build.

The party seems optimistic that the masses will harmoniously acquiesce in its revolutionary leadership.

Popular democracy, as understood by the Baath, rises on complete voluntary mutual responsiveness that can materialize between the party and the masses once the party maintains an opening with them and abandons all airs of superiority

... The leader-party ... is the force that gives expression to the people's historic role.

From this it follows that there can be no room for contradictions between the party's concepts and the concepts of the masses, but rather harmony and concurrence.

As noted above, the Baath party Constitution states that such freedoms as those of belief, speech and assembly are "sacred and inviolable." It is difficult to square this doctrine with certain principles found in the 1965 program concerning the treatment of opposition elements. The apparent contradictions grow out of a basic tension between the concepts of revolution and tolerance. History has demonstrated over and over that revolutionary parties, by their very nature, are intolerant towards elements opposed to their

revolutionary goals. The 1965 party statement indicates that the A.B.S.P. is not immune from this mentality.

*The party might be compelled, especially in the early stages of the revolution, to feign terror and coercive guidance with the object of crushing the enemies of the revolution.*<sup>3</sup>

Opposition in the administrative branch is given short shrift:

... As amputation should be the last cure, so also is the case with the government setup. Much as amputation might be necessary, it is not the remedy to be preferred. ... Rather, endeavors should be made to win over such elements to the revolution by their own free will, not by coercion or terror.

... This, however, does not mean that we must retain all former officials of various trends and leanings. Some of them have their interests irretrievably associated with those of reaction. ... *The regime must get rid of persons such as these as quickly as possible. In their respect amputation is the only cure.*

... We must not deny them (non-party bureaucrats) any of their rights *as long as they do not pursue a line opposed to the state and the revolution.*

Freedom-of-speech guarantees for the masses also take on revolutionary coloration:

... [W]e must not restrict ourselves to passing on to the masses the instructions and directives of the party, but should also listen to them and to the organizations speaking on their behalf. Among other things, this includes giving the masses the right of constructive criticism *within the limits of the nation's progressive line of destiny.* ...

Naturally, criticism under the socialist revolutionary regime cannot become an end in itself, *nor can it be allowed to proceed unchecked to the limit of undermining the nationalist socialist line itself.*

... Once it strikes deep roots and becomes sufficiently powerful, the revolution will be in a position to pardon and forgive the mistakes of others. It can then fling ... open the doors of cooperation even to those who had ranged themselves on the side of the enemy *provided they have come to appreciate the historic role of the revolution, adapt themselves to the line of the revolution, and dedicate their thoughts, endeavors and energies to its service.* ...<sup>4</sup>

There are about two million Kurds out of a total Iraqi population of approximately

<sup>2</sup> Program of the Arab Baath Socialist party, 1965, sec. III.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, "The Party and the System of Government," art. 4 (italics mine).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* (italics mine).

8,840,000. They speak their own language and have their own way of life. The Iraqi Baathists consider the settlement of the Kurdish conflict to be one of their greatest achievements.

After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the Vilayet of Mosul, inhabited by Kurds, became part of Iraq, and the entire country was mandated to Great Britain. In May, 1919, the Kurds rebelled against the British and proceeded to set up a government in the town of Sulaimaniya. Within a matter of weeks, however, the rebellion was quashed and the leaders of the revolt were expelled from the country. Nevertheless, the British were forced to put down a number of Kurdish uprisings after this initial episode.

As a result of the 1958 Iraqi revolution which ended the pro-British monarchy, the Kurds hoped that the new republican regime would find a favorable solution to their aspirations. The provisional constitution of the Iraqi republic did indeed guarantee "the national rights of the Kurds within the framework of the unity of Iraq, based on the full cooperation of all citizens and respect for, and defense of, their rights and freedoms."

### **KURDISH PROBLEMS**

Before long, however, the leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic party became disillusioned with the Iraqi government, headed by General Qasim, and during 1961 armed clashes began between the Kurds and the central authorities.

The Iraqi government attempted to end the conflict when, on June 29, 1966, it announced a twelve-point program for a peaceful settlement of the war. The program stated that the national rights of the Kurds would be recognized within a united Iraqi homeland. It declared that the Kurds would have the right to participate in government, that Kurdish would become an official language in the Kurdish areas, and that the Kurds would have the right to publish their own newspapers.

Even after this, however, the situation in Northern Iraq remained tense, and armed clashes on a reduced scale continued. Kurd-

ish leaders accused the Iraqi government of bad faith and warned against any attempt to impose a military solution.

Thus, when the Baathists came to power in the summer of 1968, one of the most pressing issues facing them was that of finding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict.

The Revolutionary Command Council initiated contacts with Mustafa al-Barzani, leader of the Democratic party of Kurdistan, and viewpoints were exchanged. Finally, on March 11, 1970, the R.C.C. promulgated a settlement agreement with the Kurds, the highlights of which are as follows:

1. The Kurdish language shall be, together with the Arabic language, the official language in areas populated by a Kurdish majority. . . .

3. In view of the state of backwardness which, in the past, afflicted the Kurdish nationality from the cultural and educational standpoints, a plan shall be worked out to make good that backwardness. This is to be achieved by:

Speeding up the implementation of the resolutions of the Revolutionary Command Council concerning the language and cultural rights of the Kurdish people and placing under the jurisdiction of the Directorate General of Kurdish Culture and Information the task of preparing and steering radio and television programs concerning Kurdish national issues. . . .

Building more schools in the Kurdish area, elevating the standards . . . and admitting, in just proportions, Kurdish students to universities. . . .

4. In the administrative units, populated by a Kurdish majority, officials shall be from among Kurds or from among persons well-versed in the Kurdish language, provided the required number is available. . . .

5. The Government concedes to the Kurdish people its right to set up student, youth, women and teacher organizations of its own—such organizations to become affiliated with the corresponding national Iraqi organizations. . . .

A body of specialists shall be constituted to work for uplifting the Kurdish area in all spheres as quickly as possible. . . . The body in question shall operate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Northern Affairs. . . .

10. It has been agreed to amend the Interim Constitution as follows:

The people of Iraq are made up of two principal nationalities: the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality. The Constitution confirms the national rights of the Kurdish people and the rights of all minorities within the framework of Iraqi unity. . . .

12. A Kurd shall be one of the vice-presidents.

14. . . . The state shall endeavor to develop . . . administrative unity and deepen and broaden the exercising by the Kurdish people therein of the sum of its national rights *as a guarantee to its enjoyment of self-rule*. Until this administrative unity is achieved, Kurdish national affairs shall be coordinated through periodic meetings between the High Committee and the governors of the northern area. . . . Self-rule is to be achieved within the framework of the Iraqi Republic. . . .

15. The Kurdish people shall share in the legislative power in a manner proportionate to its population ratio in Iraq. . . .<sup>5</sup>

Since the announcement of the peace settlement, the Iraqi authorities have acted in several ways to carry out its terms and to otherwise promote good relations with the Kurds. For example, the R.C.C. decided on January 24, 1971, to grant members of the *Peshmarga* (Kurdish peasant military forces) who were demobilized from the Kurdish resistance movement monthly allowances of ten dinars<sup>6</sup> per person. Mustafa Barzani, chairman of the Kurdistan Democratic party (K.D.P.), commented that the decision "has secured a dignified life for thousands of Kurdish citizens and contributed to providing a new condition for the economic progress of the area."<sup>7</sup>

On February 2, 1971, the Iraqi Minister of Agrarian Reform reviewed the agricultural and industrial projects either already commenced in the northern area or in the planning stage. These included the ID. 7,400,000-Sulaimaniya sugar mill due to be completed in 1972, and the ID. 11,000,000-sulfur extraction plant under construction in Kirkuk. Also, there are plans to carry out the electrification of the Dokan Dam and the Derbendi Khan Dam at an estimated cost of ID. 21 million. ID. 10 million has been appropriated for afforestation projects.

In the political realm, Saleh al-Yousifi, a member of the K.D.P. Politbureau, disclosed on March 25, 1971, that from all indications

the Kurdistan Democratic party would be allowed to name some 20 to 25 representatives to the projected 100-member National Assembly. He expressed hope that the Assembly would be given broad powers to develop the next stage in the country's life—the stage of popular democratic rule.

Yousifi, commenting on declarations made by President Bakr on the question of national front coalition politics, said that the K.D.P. "has been and still is for backing up national unity and broadening the national front, which now rests on the two allied parties, the K.D.P. and the Arab Baath Socialist party."<sup>8</sup>

It is obvious, of course, that despite "national front" participation by the K.D.P., the Baathists, with at least a 75 per cent majority in the Assembly, will be able to dominate the making of policy.

From the viewpoint of historical perspective, lasting accommodation between Baghdad and the Kurds has been most difficult to sustain. The present Baathist regime appears to be trying hard to make the March 11, 1970, settlement work. If the Kurdish region is given a significant measure of local autonomy, and if the pace of economic and social development is sufficiently rapid, then perhaps this agreement will endure.

## THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY

The Iraqi Communist party (I.C.P.) was founded in 1934. Although the party has never enjoyed legal status, periods of severe repression by Baghdad authorities have alternated with periods of laxity, when the I.C.P. was tolerated or even encouraged. The regular membership of the party is estimated at about 2,000. There are an additional 10,000 to 20,000 sympathizers who give the I.C.P. sufficient support to allow it to maintain its position as one of the most vigorous and influential of the Communist parties in the Arab world.

The first congress of the Iraqi Communist party was held in 1945, and it was not until September, 1967, that preparations were made for a second congress. Internal factionalism was so great, however, that the congress had to be postponed. A few months

<sup>5</sup> *The Baghdad Observer*, March 11, 1971.

<sup>6</sup> One U. S. dollar = 2.8 Iraqi dinars (ID.)

<sup>7</sup> *The Baghdad Observer*, February 2, 1971.

<sup>8</sup> *The Baghdad Observer*, March 26, 1971.



later the following three-way split of the I.C.P. was identified: (a) the orthodox "Central Committee" wing then under Amir Abd Allah and Baha al-Din Nuri; (b) the "Central Command" wing under Aziz al-Hajj, and (c) a minor faction called "Struggle Organization," led by Salim Fakhri.<sup>9</sup>

The Central Committee faction is generally thought of as the "official" I.C.P. It follows the Moscow line and is recognized by the Communist party of the Soviet Union. The Central Command wing has been the influential opposition group. Its leader, al-Hajj, turned to violent revolutionary activity, and by 1968 was thought to be leading a guerrilla movement in the marshes of southern Iraq. Under his guidance, the Central Command faction announced the formation of a popular resistance front.

Aziz Mohammed, First Secretary of the I.C.P. Central Committee, was most likely referring to the Central Command faction when, addressing the 1969 International Meeting of Communist Parties in Moscow, he said:

Dangerous tendencies surfaced in our party, too, as represented by a divisive "ultra-left" group of adventurers. . . . That these tendencies appeared was due to the adventurist policy and nationalist and anti-internationalist line of the ruling group in China. However, our party has coped with this petty-bourgeois trend, fought it ideologically until it was destroyed, crushed by its own barren sectarian ventures. . . .<sup>10</sup>

To understand the present-day tension and distrust between the A.B.S.P. and the Iraqi Communist party, one should go back to the time of the Qasim regime. After the 1958 revolution, there was a struggle for power between General Qasim and Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif, and the Baathists and the Communists were drawn into this struggle—on opposite sides. When Arif adopted the Baathist demand for Arab union and called

for immediate merging with the United Arab Republic, Qasim sought the support of groups likely to oppose this position. The I.C.P., although accepting Arab union in principle, opposed it in practice. The Communists, seizing a rare opportunity to enhance their power position, therefore decided to support Qasim.

Under Qasim, the Communists held key positions in the departments of Defense, Education and Guidance. The Popular Resistance Force (the militia), organized to defend the Qasim regime, came under Communist influence and persecuted pan-Arabs.

It is understandable, then, that the Communists perceived the Ramadan Revolution (February 8, 1963) as a grave threat to their position. Thus for two days the Communists and their supporters battled fiercely in the streets of Baghdad to defend the Qasim regime, but the cause was lost when Qasim's headquarters was bombed into submission.

Immediately, the Baathists created the National Guard, a civil militia designed to protect the Ramadan Revolution from opposition elements. In particular, it was instructed to counter the Communists. President Abd al-Salam Arif and some of the Baathist ministers issued orders to the guard to pursue Communists and their sympathizers. Before long excesses were committed, and the Baathists and the Communists never became reconciled during the short tenure of the first Baathist regime.

Despite this legacy of mutual antagonism, there was some evidence of rapprochement emerging after the Baathist *coup d'état* of July 17, 1968. In his speech in Moscow in 1969, Aziz Mohammed said:

Our party did not let bitter feeling and resentful recollections of the bloody reprisals showered upon Communists in 1963, when the Baath party was in power, influence its attitude to these developments, and proceeded from a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the political situation. . . .<sup>11</sup>

Aziz Mohammed then discussed the "national front" question, an issue that was to become a major cause of discord between the Iraqi Communist party and the Baathist regime.

<sup>9</sup> Richard F. Staar, ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1969* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1970), p. 477ff.

<sup>10</sup> *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, 1969* (Prague: Peace and Socialism Publishers, 1969), p. 319.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 320.

*Our party calls for a national front, for a coalition government based on that front and loyal to the front's character. It also calls for democratic freedoms, and above all freedom of political activity for the patriotic parties and forces. . . .*<sup>12</sup>

Before long, however, it became obvious that the ruling A.B.S.P. had little inclination to share power with the Iraqi Communist party. The I.C.P. began to complain, and even accused the Baathists of persecution.

The following statement was issued by a conference of the Communist parties of Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon held in January, 1971:

. . . These methods employed by the (Iraqi) regime reveal a flagrant contradiction between the deeds of some Iraqi leaders and their assurances that they are ready to cooperate with all national progressive parties and organizations and wish to form a national front with them.

We demand complete and final discontinuation of such anti-democratic methods and strict punishment for those who employ them. We demand democratic liberties for the Iraqi Communist Party and for all national and democratic parties and forces in Iraq. . . .<sup>13</sup>

Saddam Hussein, Deputy Secretary-General of the A.B.S.P. and Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, has clarified his party's stand concerning non-Baathist participation in any national front. Apparently referring to the I.C.P. and the danger of a Communist *coup d'etat* developing from within the governmental apparatus, Hussein expressed the fear that if due caution is not taken, elements outside the Baath party may join the front for tactical reasons. Having attained key positions, "it would be easy for them to come down with a sudden blow on the revolution."<sup>14</sup>

It seems reasonable to conclude that the possibility of the Iraqi Communist party joining an A.B.S.P.-K.D.P. national front government is remote.

The outstanding development in the area of economics has been the new oil agreement

signed on June 7, 1971, between the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company (I.P.C.) and the Baathist government. The accord is very favorable to Iraq, raising her oil revenues from \$512 million in 1970 to \$924 million in 1971. The I.P.C. has also agreed to give Iraq an interest-free loan of \$28 million, with repayment to begin four years from July 1, 1971. Repayment on an earlier \$56-million loan has been deferred four years.

The new oil agreement will give a much desired boost to the Iraqi economy, and will perhaps lead to an upward revision of the five-year (1970-1974) national development plan. The investment program for the year 1971-1972 is ID. 202 million, which is ID. 86 million up from the preceding year.

Space does not permit a review of all major aspects of the 1971-1972 investment program, but it should be pointed out that it did lay more emphasis than previous plans on the agricultural sector. ID. 60 million was appropriated, which is ID. 32 million more than the appropriations of the previous year. This represents an increase of 114 per cent. Recent drought conditions have underscored the need for new irrigation projects as well as the need to implement scientific farming methods. The Iraqis have been forced to use scarce foreign exchange earnings for the purpose of importing wheat, rice and other foodstuffs.

## FOREIGN RELATIONS

Although the Baathist government has been cool towards the Iraqi Communist party, the same cannot be said of relations with Communist countries. One of the resolutions passed by the A.B.S.P.'s Tenth National Convention stated that the party should "take the initiative to establish the closest ties with the Socialist Community."<sup>15</sup>

Recent tangible evidence of such close ties includes a loan agreement with the Soviet Union which was signed on April 8, 1971. The agreement was signed for Iraq by Saadun Hamadi, Minister of Oil and Minerals, and for the Soviet side by Ivan Arkhibov, First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 321 (italics mine).

<sup>13</sup> *Information Bulletin* (Toronto), April 14, 1971, p. 75.

<sup>14</sup> *The Baghdad Observer*, March 12, 1971, p. 5.

<sup>15</sup> *The Baghdad Observer*, April 7, 1971.

It grew out of preparatory discussions conducted by the Iraqi-Soviet Committee, which was created by the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement concluded between the two countries on July 4, 1969.

The ID. 80-million loan, along with its 2.5 per cent interest, is to be paid back in crude oil produced by the Iraqi National Oil Company. Among the projects to be financed by the loan will be an oil refinery in Mosul, a Baghdad-Basrah pipeline, power stations at the Dokan and Derbendi Khan dams, a phosphate mine and a fertilizer plant.

On June 23, the Iraqis signed another agreement with the U.S.S.R., referred to as a "protocol of cooperation." It calls for developing the North Rumailah Oil Field to increase the production of crude oil to 18 million tons a year, and for the construction of a canal between the Tharthar Dam on the Tigris River and the Euphrates River.

The Baathists are also on good terms with Communist China. The Iraqi government has recognized the Chinese People's Republic, and on June 27, 1971, it was announced that a small, interest-free loan of ID. 14 million had been obtained from the Chinese.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is of much less real importance to Iraq than, say, to the Arab countries of Jordan and the United Arab Republic. Iraq does not share a boundary with Israel; she did not, of course, lose territory as a result of the 1967 war, nor does she have a problem with refugees from Palestine. Nevertheless, the Baathist approach to the Israeli question is of some significance for a study of Iraq's foreign policy because: (a) the Baathists take an ideologically extremist position vis-à-vis this issue; (b) the Iraqi stand tends, to a degree, to exacerbate a very tense and explosive issue, and serves to goad Arabs to seek a violent solution, and (c) the regime's position guarantees the perpetuation of bad relations with the United States and certain other Western countries.

In April, 1971, President Bakr declared that the Baathist regime "has, right from the beginning, taken the Palestine issue as the axis of its foreign . . . policy. In the same vein, the revolution's relations with other countries are determined by the positions taken by such countries on the Palestine issue." Calling for a revival of the "Eastern Front," Bakr said: "Revolutionary Iraq has laid all of its weight behind endeavors to bring up a strong Eastern Front under a united military command that can fully live up to its nationalist commitments. . . ."<sup>16</sup>

On another occasion, the President summarized the Iraqi position as calling for the "utter rejection of the Security Council's No. 242 resolution, the Rogers Plan, the artificial Palestine state formula, and the rest of the proposed solutions insulting and humiliating to Arabism."<sup>17</sup>

Of greater regional significance for Iraq are her strained relations with Iran, centering on two main issues: the status of the Shatt al-Arab<sup>18</sup> and Iran's claim to certain islands near the Strait of Hormuz.

The Iranians have condemned the 1937 treaty, which gives Iraq control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, on the grounds that it was entered into at a time when Iraq was a British protectorate and that it was imposed on Iran under conditions which no longer exist. Iran has declared a willingness to negotiate a shipping agreement covering the Shatt al-Arab on the basis of the *thalweg* principle. Iraq, however, has refused to negotiate the issue, insisting that the 1937 treaty is still valid in international law.

A complex and potentially explosive issue centers on the question of sovereignty over the three islands of Abu Mousa, Big Tumb and Minor Tumb. The British are in the process of withdrawing from the Persian Gulf  
(Continued on page 49)

Roy E. Thoman held the Kentucky Research Foundation Fellowship, the Haggin Fellowship and the William A. Patterson Fellowship while preparing his doctoral dissertation. He has just received a grant from West Texas State University to do research in his field.

<sup>16</sup> *The Baghdad Observer*, April 11, 1971.

<sup>17</sup> *The Baghdad Observer*, March 15, 1971.

<sup>18</sup> The Shatt al-Arab is a river about 120 miles long, formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates. It flows through Iraq to the Persian Gulf and forms part of the Iraq-Iran border.

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*By the end of 1971, "... the Turkish military had come to power by proxy; Turkey's major ally, the United States, had pronounced benediction; and the unfortunate Turkish nation's 'time of troubles' seemed indefinitely prolonged."*

## Turkey: A Time of Troubles

BY DWIGHT JAMES SIMPSON

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THERE IS MUCH to admire in the complex historical record of modern Turkey. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, the foundations of the present Turkish Republic were laid by the master builder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This great leader, who was an authentic political genius, both led and pushed Turkey into revolutionary changes which have transformed Turkey in a manner that would be incomprehensible to her former Ottoman rulers.

Basically, Atatürk, the brilliant army officer turned politician, was a man of science, a secularist and a reforming modernizer. Atatürk's reforms began in 1922, with the abolition of the Sultanate. In the ensuing comparatively brief period until his death in 1938, they included the abolition of the Caliphate, the suppression of the Islamic religious orders, the secularization of Turkish law, the introduction of the Latin alphabet and the granting of women's suffrage. These drastic changes, not all of which received ready acceptance from the population, were accomplished within the framework of a one-party, semiauthoritarian political system and an economic order (often labelled *Kemalism* after its founder) which was a fundamentally *étatist* system of state monopoly of control in key production and service sectors of the country's economy. Until World War II, the ruling elite of Atatürk's Republican People's party sought to consolidate and extend these basic reforms.

Turkey maintained a precarious neutrality during World War II, and in 1950 ventured for the first time into the potentially perilous area of full political democracy. In the general elections of May, 1950, the first free, multiparty elections in Turkish history were held. The recently established Democratic party, under the leadership of the ill-fated Adnan Menderes, defeated the Republicans and assumed control. The following ten years of Democratic party control were marked by great economic development, a loosening of government monopoly (with the consequent rapid growth of private economic enterprise); and the emergence of new groups contending for political and economic power (peasants, urban middle class businessmen and entrepreneurs).

Although Menderes was a charismatic, resourceful and politically very popular leader, he was fundamentally unlucky. Having set in motion great economic changes which in turn gave rise to strong currents of political and social unrest, Menderes had the bad luck to see his personal popularity in certain sectors decline just at the period when he needed more time to solve some of the country's massive problems. In particular, Menderes' mismanagement of the country's economy had caused great hardship for the urban population who were buffeted by monetary inflation, rising prices and consumer goods shortages. Moreover, Menderes' attempts to suppress the country's newly found political freedom alienated the university students



and middle class intelligentsia. Most dangerously, his ambiguous political style seemed to encourage a revival of Islam. This latter, although politically popular with the very conservative Turkish peasantry, was anathema to the Army, whose leaders saw themselves as the protectors of Atatürk's secular legacy.

In May, 1960, the Turkish army overthrew the Menderes government and arrested the Prime Minister. After a long, theatrical trial for "crimes against the constitution," Menderes was convicted and hanged. For the next five years the government of Turkey, although outwardly civilian in character, was actually under military control.

### A RETURN TO FREE ELECTIONS

In 1965, however, the decision was made to return to the multiparty, free-election system. In that year, the new Justice party, successor to the legally proscribed Democratic party, won a complete victory. Süleyman Demirel, a young engineer with scant previous political experience, became the new Prime Minister. This electoral result was clearly paradoxical. Demirel, both in political style and in viewpoint, was strongly reminiscent of the recently executed Menderes. Like Menderes, Demirel sanctioned the growth of private enterprise in the economy. He also was not above exploiting the currents of Islam which run deep just below the surface in Turkish life. And he was at great pains to accentuate his personal ties to the Turkish peasantry, thus raising fears of a conservative-Islamic revival in the minds of the secularist city-dwellers. In a word, Demirel was far more similar to Menderes than he was different. But to its credit, the Turkish army, having reinstalled the free electoral process, now honorably abided by its result.

However, the army obviously held strong reservations. In an address on August 30, 1968, President Cevdet Sunay, a former army general, sounded a cautionary note to Demirel, who by then had been three years in office. Sunay declared the aim of the Turkish state was "to secure a living standard worthy of human dignity of every citizen"

and warned against the curtailment or abrogation of constitutional rights (a not very subtle reference to the fate of Menderes). It was "illegitimate," the President concluded, to push the constitution "to the extreme right or to the extreme left with *faits accomplis*." This was a quite clear restatement of the Turkish army's view of politics since Atatürk's death: moderately reformist in economic terms and centrist in political terms. It also pointed out clearly a peculiar paradox of Turkish political life of which informed Turks, of whatever party or ideological persuasion, are becoming increasingly aware.

On the one hand, the army issued a warning against any unconstitutional or extra-constitutional behavior on the part of Prime Minister Demirel or any other Turkish political elements. At the same time, when it deposed Menderes and seized power, the army had intruded itself into the Turkish political process in a manner not authorized by the Turkish constitution. Apparently, the army spokesmen meant to exempt themselves from their demands for strictly constitutional behavior. However that may be, it is plain that there is nothing in the Turkish constitution giving the army a mandate to function as constitutional arbiter of the political process. But by its behavior since 1950, the army has become an increasingly active interventionist force—always in the name of "protecting" the constitution, and by a repeated use of what are, in plain speech, unconstitutional means.

### THE ARMY POSITION

Another and even more serious paradox facing the army has to do with its moderate reformist, political centrist stance. Although constantly invoking the name of Atatürk, the army has actually staked out a position which both ideologically and tactically is far different from that of the founder of the Republic. Atatürk was never a moderate reformist and was even less a political centrist. He was a revolutionary who adopted extreme measures in pursuit of extreme goals. Now, presumably according to President Sunay, speaking on behalf of the army, Atatürk him-

self would be proscribed from contemporary Turkish political life unless he rid himself of his characteristic extremist tendencies.

From this analysis, and from the army's subsequent actions, it seems reasonable to suggest that Atatürk's self-proclaimed heirs in the highest echelons of the army are at least as anxious to preserve the precarious *status quo* of Turkish life—from which they benefit considerably—as to fulfill the Atatürk revolution first set in motion 50 years ago. It is also reasonable to suggest that the army, by effectively proscribing all but centrist politics in the Turkish political process, has had a deadening, stifling impact on political life and has helped to give rise to the very "extremism" which the army so militantly opposes.

### ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES

Clear signs that the *status quo* was already badly eroded emerged after 1968. Part of the trouble was due to the continued faltering of the Turkish economy. Although the Demirel government maintained a high level of investment and a growth rate close to the annual target of seven per cent laid down in the State Economic Plan, resources had been severely strained, leading to a near-crisis balance of payments deficit and a consequent devaluation of the Turkish lira. At the same time, while most industrial firms made increasingly higher profits, chronic inflation continued, nullifying the benefits of wage and salary increases almost as soon as they were given (in 1963–1968 the general price index rose by 72 per cent).

In June, 1970, there were violent disorders in Istanbul, arising from militant left-wing opposition to proposed changes in trade union legislation, and leading to the imposition of martial law in the city and adjacent industrial areas for the first time since the overthrow of the Menderes regime in 1960. In January, 1971, a wave of strikes, work stoppages and protests by public employees broke out after the Demirel government had proposed changes in existing statutes which would have increased wages but would also have transferred many employees to the cate-

gory of civil servants, thus depriving them of the right to strike and some other benefits. In response to continuing pressure from the employees, the government trebled the original estimates designed to finance the new wage boosts to 6 billion lira (approximately \$400 million), thus arousing active fears of a further massive stimulus to an already nearly runaway inflation.

These dismal developments in the economic sector were in some part balanced by the knowledge that the industrialization of Turkey is proceeding and that over the longer run the picture ought therefore to be brighter. The second five-year plan currently operative allocates 23 per cent of national investment to manufacturing, a value of approximately \$2 billion. This sum is nearly double the amount realized in the first plan. Top priority has been given to chemicals, fertilizers, iron and steel, paper, petroleum, cement and vehicle tires, while second priority is given to machinery and equipment. Reflecting the balance between the public and private sectors of the economy, government investment is to concentrate on the infrastructure, education and public health, while private investment centers on manufacturing.

Turkish oil production reached an annual volume of 3 million barrels by 1971 and for the first time meets domestic demand. Refinery capacity is being expanded and Turkey may soon enter the export trade in specialized petroleum products. The great Keban Dam on the Euphrates River is near completion. This is the biggest single construction undertaking in the country's history and will represent an investment of approximately \$500 million. By mid-1972, the first power from the Keban project will become available. Eventually 1.25 million kilowatt hours will pass through a 500-mile grid system to industries and towns in a wide area of relatively undeveloped eastern Turkey.

Turkey has received very significant amounts of foreign aid in her industrial expansion (over \$2 billion from the United States alone). The Demirel regime signed agreements with the Soviet Union for Russian aid to a value of \$250 million for con-

struction of an oil refinery, aluminum and steel plants and other basic industrial projects. This will bring to Turkey over 1,000 Russian engineers and technicians, a result which would have been politically impossible fifteen years ago. There is no doubt that the foundations of a modern industrial economy are in the process of construction in Turkey. What is in doubt is whether the political unrest and social dislocations in part attributable to quite rapid economic change can be prevented from tearing the country apart.

### **STUDENT VIOLENCE**

Beginning in 1968, the Turkish universities experienced an almost endless series of violent outbreaks. These arose in part from purely educational problems. Traditionally, the internal structure of Turkish education has been markedly authoritarian. Courses, lectures, examinations and degree awards were either regulated by the Ministry of Education or by a jealously guarded university autonomy residing in university administrations of rectors, deans and ranking professors. In no case was student opinion consulted or ever permitted to help define content and procedures of these important university affairs. Not unlike students elsewhere in the world, Turkish university students considered the "system" archaic, unfair, irrelevant and, in many ways, inimical to student interests and objectives.

In addition to these fundamental complaints, which university and political authorities were slow and somewhat inept to handle, Turkish university youth has become increasingly politicized over the past decade. Additionally, there has been a marked growth of both left and right extremism among university youth. Again, in part, this is a Turkish reflection of conditions in universities abroad. The American student protest movement and the French student revolts which momentarily imperiled the Paris regime have had an obvious impact on Turkish student thinking. There also were peculiarly Turkish factors at work, however. Given the status of Turkish politics, kept under tight rein by the army, there are few channels in

the Turkish political process for political parties or movements which stray too far to the left or to the right of the centrist position approved by the army.

Because of the army's insistence that all politics hew to the centrist line, and because the two major parties, Democrat and Republican People's, have in doing so seemed to function mainly to reinforce the *status quo*, the student response has been one of frustration, often leading to extremism and violence. The short-run answer on the part of the state, acting at the behest of the army, has been mainly repression of militant student movements. Over the longer run, it may be hoped that effective means may be found to integrate students, however militant, into the political mainstream.

Given the extent and depth of student violence during 1970-1971, however, it seemed clear that a government resort to force was the only means to retrieve a rapidly deteriorating situation. Not only were the major universities in Ankara and Istanbul the scenes of nearly continuous protests, riots and bombings, the provincial universities were also feeling the impact of student discontent. In December, 1970, a student was killed in prolonged fighting at the Black Sea Technical University in Trabzon when right-wing students attacked left-wingers occupying university buildings. Police opened fire when the left-wing students began throwing bombs. According to press reports, the dead student was the 18th to have been killed since the beginning of student riots in mid-1968. In addition, several hundred students and police have been wounded.

### **THE ARMY'S RESPONSE**

Events were rapidly nearing a climax and the anticipated response of the army was soon forthcoming. In a statement issued on New Year's Day, 1971, General Memduh Tagmaç, chief of the general staff, warned that "the armed forces, whose mission is to protect the country against any danger from without or within, will smash any action directed against the country." The general further declared that "the clashes between ideologically op-

posed students" carried a clear risk of civil war. However, he underscored the fact that the army "firmly believed that this anarchy can easily be suppressed within a democratic order by the responsible constitutional bodies."

For the first time, however, there was some evidence that opinions differed among high ranking military officers about the proper course of action. General Muhsin Batur, the air force commander, was known to have twice personally warned President Sunay about the possible consequences of the prevailing chaos. General Batur wrote to the President, to Prime Minister Demirel and to the National Security Council that many military officers were becoming increasingly attracted to what he termed "socialist ideas." As preventive measures, General Batur called for immediate legislation on urgent matters including agrarian reform, the nationalization of foreign trade, a more equitable tax system, and improvement of the living standard of public employees, most notably including the armed forces. In a second memorandum, General Batur called for a substantially enlarged political role for the National Security Council and the establishment of a "constituent assembly," presumably to be dominated by the military, which would act as a strict supervisory body over the whole of Turkish political life. Read in their entirety General Batur's memoranda were a thinly disguised call for a Turkish military takeover.

It was at this point that Prime Minister Demirel's position became impossible. By this time, he had virtually lost his clear majority in the Grand National Assembly (Parliament) due to a series of defections from his ruling Justice party. Although the government could still muster a bare voting majority, Demirel's margin of control had narrowed to the point where he was powerless to cope by means of legislation with the many-faceted crisis confronting Turkey. And at the same time that Demirel's effective political power had nearly disappeared, the army demanded that he act vigorously and along lines the senior military officers sought to impose on him.

On March 12, 1971, General Tagmaç (chief of the general staff), General Faruk Gürler (army commander), Admiral Celal Eyiceoglu (navy commander), and General Batur (air force commander) delivered to President Sunay and to the Grand National Assembly their final "memorandum" demanding a "strong and credible government." The four commanders alleged that the "Parliament and Government, through their sustained policies, views and actions, have driven our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest." After calling for a "strong and credible government," the military leaders concluded with a blunt warning that unless their suggestions were followed immediately "the armed forces are determined to take over the administration of the state."

Prime Minister Demirel's Cabinet resigned the same day. President Sunay accepted the resignation, asking the Cabinet to remain temporarily in office until a new government could be formed. On March 13, the President held conversations with the four military leaders as well as with the leaders of the major political parties. Demirel, who refused to take part in these meetings personally, bitterly defended his record in an impassioned speech to a special meeting of his Justice party deputies and senators on March 14. In part, Demirel insisted that "no one can find any fault with your government except that we adhered to the rule of law and the constitution." He declared that his government was forced to resign by military pressure and spoke ominously of the "wound Turkish democracy has received" from the armed forces' action.

President Sunay, on the other hand, sought to counter Demirel's interpretation of events by means of a nation-wide radio broadcast on March 15. Although speaking ostensibly as President of the Republic, Sunay in fact seemed to be speaking as the representative of the military high command of which he himself had been a recent member. Sunay declared that the military leaders "had carried out the duties vested in them." Saying that "a new era" was beginning, the President



stated that the military commanders had acted because they "know well the bitter truth about the country." The constitution, in the President's view, was concerned not "merely with the establishment of a democratic regime" but must be an instrument for coping with "extremism." He concluded by stating that the country had "reached a stage in which it is no longer possible to condone and tolerate differences of beliefs, attitudes, and behavior between citizens and organizations whose duty it is to enforce the Constitution." Whatever this presidential analysis of the constitution may have lacked in understanding, appreciation and subtlety, it surely was an open statement of the high command's intention to clamp a lid on the boiling Turkish political cauldron.

President Sunay then began his search for the man who would become Prime Minister and who would, presumably, carry out the policies enunciated by the military leadership. Ismet İnönü, the 85-year-old leader of the Republican People's party, who had been a colleague of the great Atatürk, declared that it was impossible to expect a democratic Parliament to legislate at military dictation, and thus it would be wrong to form more than a transitional government whose principal task would be to prepare for a new national election. Under subsequent intense pressure, İnönü retreated from this position and eventually agreed to lend his party's support to a "strong government" if one could be formed. Prime Minister Demirel also eventually agreed to offer at least nominal collaboration with a new government even though Demirel's ability to speak on behalf of his Justice party had been badly impaired by recent mass defections. It was in the leadership of the Republican People's party, however, that the biggest obstacle was encountered. Bulent Ecevit, the R.P.P. Secretary-General and heir apparent to İnönü, refused to accept the decision to collaborate.

Ecevit had been the principal architect of the Republican People's party's decision to adopt a "left-of-center" stance, and had worked diligently to change the party's centrist, elitist and bureaucratic image. At a

press conference on March 21, Ecevit stated his refusal to collaborate with a new army-sponsored government, and resigned from his party on these grounds. Then in a display of personal courage, if not prudence, Ecevit flatly accused the Turkish armed forces of having intervened in a way "fundamentally similar to the Greek model," although, he conceded, in a bit "more subtle and clever" manner. In both Greece and Turkey, Ecevit declared, the *coups* took place against non-centrist opposition parties which seemed to have a reasonable chance of coming to power in a free election. For his bluntness, Ecevit was rewarded with the announcement the following day that he was to be prosecuted for having "insulted the President and the armed forces."

Nearly simultaneously, President Sunay announced the nomination of Professor Nihat Erim as Prime Minister. Erim quickly formed his Cabinet, and on April 7 his government was given an overwhelming vote of confidence by the Grand National Assembly, whose members were by now fully conscious of the unspoken but controlling presence of the army as a party to their deliberations. Erim was in one sense an obvious choice by the army. A ranking member of the Republican People's party, he had been strongly opposed to the "left-of-center" orientation adopted by the party at Ecevit's urging. This stance of Erim's had clearly underscored his position as a centrist and, in the current crisis, made him fully acceptable to the army. In another sense, however, many observers of Turkey were puzzled, even astonished, not that Erim was offered the Prime Minister's post, but that he accepted. Erim has for many years been one of Turkey's leading authorities on constitutional law and thus he,

*(Continued on page 50)*

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## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

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# Secretary Rogers Discusses a Middle East Peace Plan

*On October 4, 1971, United States Secretary of State William P. Rogers addressed the U.N. General Assembly on the need for building a "structure of peace." His remarks on what he termed a "third major step toward peace" in the Middle East are reprinted here:*

Over several years, the United Nations has made determined and persistent efforts to achieve a lasting peace in . . . [the Middle East]. Nonetheless, the opportunities for success and the risks of failure remain in precarious balance.

Security Council Resolution 242, establishing the principles for a durable peace, was the first major step toward reason after 18 years of belligerency and a fragile, often violated armistice.

The ceasefire along the Suez Canal, now nearing its fifteenth month, was a second major step away from war.

It is time for a third major step toward peace.

For four years Ambassador [Gunnar] Jarring has worked diligently to secure the agreement called for in Security Council Resolution 242. We support his efforts. We believe his Mission remains the best path to an overall settlement and to lasting peace. Our views on such a final peace settlement remain those expressed in President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report earlier this year and in my statement of December 9, 1969.

Both sides to the conflict are committed to the fundamental and reciprocal principles to which the Jarring Mission is dedicated—of living in peace with each other and of withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict as set forth in Security Council Resolution 242. But, despite those commitments, a deep gulf of suspicion and distrust remains.

Each side is convinced of the justice of its cause. Each is concerned about its future security. A political settlement—based on mutual accommodation—could assure both. An attempt to achieve these ends by force will destroy all possibilities for either.

This is why we believe a third major step toward peace is essential:

- a step which can be taken now;
- a step that is practical;
- a step that could help create the confidence and trust which are now lacking;

—a step toward full and complete implementation of Resolution 242.

That step is an interim Suez Canal agreement. That is why the United States has welcomed the interest of both Egypt and Israel in such an agreement. That is why at the request of the parties the United States has undertaken to play a constructive role in the process of arriving at an agreement.

In order to explore the possibilities of each side we have discussed concrete and specific ideas, designed to meet the legitimate needs and concerns of both sides. These ideas, given willingness and good intention on both sides, could become the basis for a break-through. They require further quiet discussions with the parties, an undertaking which we now hope can be expedited along the following lines.

*A first point is the relationship between an interim agreement and an overall settlement.*

A fair approach should be founded on two basic principles:

—that a Suez Canal agreement is merely a step toward complete and full implementation of Resolution 242 within a reasonable period of time and not an end in itself, that has to be clearly established in any agreement.

—that neither side can realistically expect to achieve, as part of an interim settlement, complete agreement on the terms and conditions of an overall settlement. If that were the case, there would be no necessity for an interim settlement. Those final terms and conditions will have to be worked out by negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. And we would hope that if an interim agreement is reached, that active negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices could be renewed.

*A second point is the matter of the ceasefire.*

Its maintenance is in the interest of all of us, of

*(Continued on page 47)*

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### ON THE MIDDLE EAST

ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS. By J. L. TALMON. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971. 199 pages, index, \$5.95.)

This book is a collection of three essays by a professor of modern history at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The first two essays concern "Jews Between Revolution and Counter-Revolution," and "Types of Jewish Self-Awareness." The third essay, "Israel Among the Nations: The Six Day War in Historical Perspective," is a sensitive discussion of a dilemma of twentieth century Jewry: "Israel has been seen as the fulfilment and ultimate denouement of Jewish history, but it has also been seen as the greatest deviation from the course of that history." Tracing the story of Zionism from its beginnings, Talmon notes that, in the shadow of Hitlerian genocide, "The story of the final break-through to Jewish statehood was a great epic." Nonetheless, "The inevitable transformation of the pioneers of yesterday into the managers of today has brought into sharp relief the anti-monies which arise when a great faith, heroic memories and a beautiful myth are carried over into the context of a changed reality." Discussing the continuing Arab-Israeli dispute with a historian's objectivity, the author points out that "The Arabs cannot get a 'just' peace and the Jews are unable to obtain a 'total' and 'true' peace. All that can be hoped for at present is a stemming of the tide, in the hope of its gradual ebbing away." In his postscript, the author concludes that "More and more Israelis are beginning to realize that 'politics is a choice between the unpalatable and the disastrous'"; he notes that some observers detect a similar view in the Arab world. Hopefully, events will prove him right.

O.E.S.

THE RIFT IN ISRAEL. By C. CLEMENT LESLIE. (New York: Schocken Books, 1971. 185 pages, notes and index, \$7.50.)

The conflict between religious authority and secular democracy, between religion and nationalism, is the subject of this "essay in interpretation." Leslie prepared this brief study with the help of about 100 interviews in Israel; the result is a well written discussion of some of Israel's most pressing problems. The book is divided into four sections: "Background," two very brief chapters on Jewish history; "Division," the secular versus the religious and the conflict between religion and non-religion; "Witness," the working out of the Jewish concept of social justice; "What is a Jew," descriptive and analytical chapters on the question of Jewish identity. "On what terms Israel is to find its full reconciliation, after what illusions shed, what dear convictions yielded up, is the question that remains." This interesting essay does not offer the answer, but it illumines the question.

O.E.S.

EGYPT UNDER NASIR. By R. HRAIR DEKMEJIAN. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971. 368 pages, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

This "study in political dynamics" traces the Egyptian political system from 1952 through the aftermath of Nasser's death in 1970. Because the study is cast into a theoretical framework as an aid to analysis, the book is of more interest to political scientists than to the general reader. The author, an associate professor of political science, draws on graphs, tables and charts and academic vocabulary to develop his discussion of Egypt and his portrait of Egypt's charismatic leader. The book focuses on Nasser; in addition, the Egyptian power elite is described by means of

a detailed study of 131 leaders, and political trends are explored. O.E.S.

**UNDERSTANDING THE MIDDLE EAST.** BY JOE E. PIERCE. (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1971. 232 pages, notes, selected readings and index, \$5.50.)

A professor of anthropology at Portland State College who has lived and worked for almost seven years in the Middle East, Joe E. Pierce offers the reader an anthropologist's view of the nations of the Middle East. "To an anthropologist the Middle East is a *culture area*," he writes, and in terms of cultural likenesses he defines the Middle East as "an area which encompasses Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and a large strip across the northern Sudan in North Africa, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Yemen, Aden, Syria, Afghanistan, West Pakistan and part of northwestern India as well as some transition areas surrounding this core."

The "mosaic" of cultures found in the area is distinctive. The author discusses the region in terms of this mosaic, devoting separate chapters to analysis of Middle Eastern attitudes toward virginity, honor, the supernatural, the ceremonies of life and hospitality, and the material aspects of culture. Illustrations add to the interest of this well-written brief study. O.E.S.

**ISRAEL: A PERSONAL HISTORY.** BY DAVID BEN-GURION. (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1971. 862 pages, index, photographs, \$20.00.)

Israel's first Prime Minister writes the history of the state of Israel and his own autobiography in a single volume. A personal record, the book is not a historian's objective study but an emotional and moving account of epic years in the history of Israel. As Ben-Gurion sees it, "Without grasping [the Jewish people's] . . . unique spiritual and moral character and historic mission, it is impossible to understand the history of the Jewish nation." Starting his story with "The Rebirth of a Nation," he

describes the history of the first 20 years of Israeli independence, the wars, the political difficulties, the economic challenges—all from first-hand knowledge and with much detail.

What of the future? Ben-Gurion calls on Jewish mothers to raise Israel's birth-rate; he also asks for an increase in immigration into Israel. "What has been done in Israel in the seventy years before and the twenty years after the birth of the State proves that the Jewish people do indeed have the makings of a unique people," he concludes. "The secret of the Jewish nation's survival . . . is nothing but the *superior quality of the Hebrew nation*." Even those who disagree with Ben-Gurion's thesis will welcome this detailed and personal history of Israel. Photographs add to the book's interest. O.E.S.

**MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICAL SYSTEMS.** BY DANKWART A. RUSTOW. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 114 pages, appendix, bibliography and index, \$2.75, paper; \$5.95, cloth.)

One of the Prentice-Hall Comparative Asian Government series, this book follows the systematic outline used by the rest of the series; it begins with a historical, geographic and socioeconomic survey and analyzes Middle Eastern politics on an area-wide basis.

The author states that Islam establishes a measure of unity throughout the area, so that the creation of Israel was bound to cause political difficulties. He believes that a quest for a basic national identity and countrywide systems of administration are still major political problems.

In assessing the future in the Middle East, we should remember that the area has been a crossroads of power conflict since the time of Darius. A series of great power alliances have maintained a shaky peace between Israel and the Arab world, but it seems evident that the Middle East will continue to be one of the world's trouble spots. O.E.S.



REVOLUTIONS AND MILITARY RULE  
IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Volume II:  
The Arab States. BY GEORGE M. HADDAD.  
(New York: Robert Speller and Sons,  
1971. 587 pages, bibliography and index,  
\$12.50.)

The first volume in this three-volume  
(Continued on page 52)

## SECRETARY ROGER'S PEACE PLAN

(Continued from page 44)

everyone concerned, of everyone in this room; in fact, in the interest of the whole world. The ultimate objective, of course, is a permanent end to belligerency as part of a final binding peace agreement. But such a commitment is not realizable in the context of an interim agreement. Neither would a ceasefire of a short duration be realistic. With goodwill on both sides, it should be possible to find common understanding between the parties on this issue.

### *Third, is the zone of withdrawal.*

There are, of course, very important strategic considerations involved in this key point. However, based on our discussions, we believe it should be possible to meet the principal concerns of both sides. Without going into the details, let me say merely that I believe that in the long run the most significant aspect of an interim agreement might prove to be that it established the principle of withdrawal looking to an overall settlement as a fact rather than as a theory.

### *Fourth, is the nature of the Supervisory Arrangements.*

Both sides must have confidence that the agreement will not be violated, and that adequate machinery will be provided for prompt detection of any infractions. We are confident that ways reassuring to both Israel and Egypt can be found for altering and strengthening the supervisory mechanisms which have existed in the area for the past two decades.

### *Fifth, is the question of an Egyptian presence east of the Suez Canal.*

The reopening and operation of the Suez Canal would require Egyptian personnel east of the Canal. It is understandable, too, that normal activities should be pursued in as much of the zone evacuated as possible. The question of an Egyptian military presence east of the Canal is one on which the parties hold opposite views. But here, too, based on our discussions, we believe that there are possibilities for compromise.

### *Sixth, is the use of the Suez Canal.*

The United States has long held that the Canal should be open to passage for all nations without discrimination. This principle is clear in the Security Council Resolution of November, 1967. What is presently at issue in considering an interim agreement is principally the timing at which this right could be exercised. We believe that an accommodation on this point is quite possible.

Now with these six points in mind let me say this, because the parties have asked us, we intend to continue our determined effort to assist them in arriving at an interim agreement. This effort, we believe, is imperative, this is important to keep in mind, because there is no more realistic and hopeful alternative to pursue.

There are risks to peace; but the greater risk is inaction, unwillingness to face up to the hard decisions.

A practical step now—an interim agreement—

—would make the next step toward peace less difficult for all the parties to take;

—it would restore the use of the Suez Canal as a waterway for international shipping;

—it would reestablish Egypt's authority over a major national asset;

—it would separate the combatants;

—it would produce the first Israeli withdrawal;

—it would extend the ceasefire;

—it would diminish the risk of major power involvement, and

—it would be an important step toward the complete implementation of Security Council Resolution 242.

I submit that the logic for such an agreement is overwhelming. If the leaders of the area would grasp this opportunity, they would give new hope to their people for tranquility, for progress and for peace.

In all of our efforts, both in the United Nations and elsewhere, we should recall that nothing we do matters so much as the legacy we leave to those who follow—the bridge we build between the past and the future. There is a tendency, especially when tensions are high and tempers short, to regard the present as the focal point of all of man's history. But ours is only the latest generation, not the last generation; and nothing we leave to future generations will matter so much as the structure of enduring peace.

Peace must be achieved and maintained not by the decree of a few but by accommodation among many. Each government, in upholding its people's particular interests, must also advance the world interest in a peace which will endure.

To that interest the United Nations, from its creation, has been dedicated.

To that interest the United States pledges anew its best efforts.

## ISRAEL'S QUEST FOR SECURITY

*(Continued from page 5)*

*Galei Zahal*, the Israel Defense Forces' radio station, Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir denied that he had proposed a cut in the defense budget. He said that he had told Defense Minister Dayan that "all the funds allocated for the purchase of Phantoms, Skyhawks, tanks, armoured cars, electronic equipment from abroad are sacrosanct."<sup>27</sup> In addition to the monetary costs of defense there are also heavy burdens of manpower. In personal terms, the contribution is universal—young men serve for up to three years, girls serve for about twenty months, and many former servicemen are called to fulfill reserve obligations each year.<sup>28</sup>

Included in the defense equation has been the security afforded Israel by the geographic changes resulting from the June War. On numerous occasions, Israeli spokesmen have noted the strategic benefits to Israel of the

1967 cease-fire lines and their preference for these over those which existed from 1948 to 1967. As one former I.A.D. officer has suggested:

Israel's presence on the Suez Canal, on the Jordan River and on the Golan Heights has given her, for the first time since her independence, a relief from the menace to her survival. Although the conflict lasts, the real issue is now no longer Israel's survival.<sup>29</sup>

Israel's Chief-of-Staff, General Haim Bar-Lev, has suggested that the security position resulting from the Six Day War provided Israel with greater flexibility and a greater number of alternative strategic military options.<sup>30</sup>

The administered territories have a significance which goes beyond geographic security—they have political, economic and social weight as well. Generally, Israel has sought to foster economic and social development and to improve living conditions and standards in these territories. Israel is pursuing policies designed to improve her relations with the Arabs under her control and partially to dispell her negative image in the Arab world. To this end, Israel's administration has followed a policy of minimal presence and wide latitude with regard to the activities of the traditional Arab leadership.<sup>31</sup> It has also emphasized increased contacts between Arabs in the administered areas and those in the neighboring Arab states through the "open bridges" policy and the practice of "summer visits."<sup>32</sup>

The maintenance of the defense budget at record levels and the desire to retain the administered territories until peace is achieved are direct outcomes of the continued hostility of Israel's immediate neighbors, the implacable opposition of the Palestinian guerrillas and the constant threat of a resumption of warfare (with the possibility of Soviet participation as a result of the U.S.S.R.'s heavy involvement in Egypt and its commitment of men, money, equipment and prestige to its Arab clients). The importance of security and its centrality in Israeli thinking have been obvious from the inception of the state. A

*(Continued on page 52)*

<sup>27</sup> Interview with Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir on *Galei Zahal*, October 11, 1971, as reported in *Jerusalem Post*, October 12, 1971. See also Moshe Ater, "The Defence Budget in Perspective," *Jerusalem Post*, October 14, 1971, for commentary on the budget and the debate pertaining to it.

<sup>28</sup> Some girls are exempted on religious and other grounds. Conscientious objectors are virtually non-existent—during 1970–1971 there were only 8 cases. Interview with Rav-Aluf Bar-Lev, *Jerusalem Post*, September 13, 1971.

<sup>29</sup> Alouph Hareven, "Israel in Protracted Conflict," *Midstream* 15:3–11 (November, 1969), p. 5. See also "The Middle East and American Security Policy," Report of Senator Henry M. Jackson to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, December, 1970. Pages 22 and 23 of that report contain maps showing Israel's vulnerability to hostile fire before and after the Six Day War.

<sup>30</sup> *Jerusalem Post*, interview, September 13, 1971.

<sup>31</sup> See "Three Years of Military Government, 1967–1970—Data on Civilian Activities in Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai" (Ministry of Defense, Coordinator of Government Operations in the Administered Territories, June, 1970), especially Part I, "The Structure and Activities of the Military Government."

<sup>32</sup> The summer visits program allows Arabs living beyond the armistice lines to visit relatives in the administered areas for a prolonged time. In 1971, there were in excess of 100,000 such visits. See *Jerusalem Post*, September 14 and 15, 1971.

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## LEBANON

*(Continued from page 24)*

But speculation mounted that the dead leader, supposedly the commander of a unit to fight off Israeli soldiers, was actually responsible for checking on guerrilla movements and was killed, therefore, as an example to others. Seeking to reestablish themselves among the Lebanese, the guerrillas, in January, 1971, tried to tighten discipline and undertook a purge of the so-called "bogus guerrillas," whom they held responsible for the November murders and for another recent incident in Beirut when a member of Al Fateh was killed, allegedly by members of the Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine. These incidents had apparently aroused much anxiety within the guerrilla movement itself; in January, Al Fateh closed its offices in Palestine refugee camps situated in Lebanon and withdrew weapons from its Lebanese-based guerrillas.

The abatement of guerrilla activity enabled the Lebanese government to concentrate upon its attempt to revive a sagging economy that had been depressed since a 1966 banking crisis and had been staggered by the Six Day War of 1967. There was mounting concern over the number of foreign countries that had established their regional headquarters in Middle East countries other than Lebanon, once a preferred location. Many Lebanese suspected that the clashes between the guerrillas and Israeli troops caused many companies to avoid locating in their country. Consequently, the government, taking advantage of the lull in guerrilla operations, tried to make Lebanon a more attractive place for foreign investment and undertook to improve telephone and water service and to root out corruption. A durable peace, however, will probably elude the Lebanese and other Arab peoples until a just solution of the problems of the Palestinian refugees causes the Arab guerrilla movement, the militant expression of their demands, to cease its military operations and cooperate in the building of a Palestinian state.

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## JORDAN IN TURMOIL

*(Continued from page 19)*

in both foreign and domestic policy. It covered the economic and social structure, public services, education and general ideological directives. The draft charter of the one-party regime declared the Jordanian people "an indivisible part of the Arab nation," under a constitutional monarchy. National unity, the program insisted, lay at the foundation of Arab unity.

Indeed, in matters of foreign policy, the program spoke of "the national sovereignty of all peoples" and their right freely to determine their own destiny without external interference on the part of anyone. It called for continuation of the struggle to liberate the territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 conflict, backed liberation struggles against "imperialism," working within the United Nations Charter, and rejected military pacts and alliances. The National Union also stood for the peaceful solution of international issues and unification of Arab foreign policies. It eschewed differences among the Arab states. Jordan, nevertheless, was not a member of the new Federation of Arab Republics, and there was little indication that the National Union would appeal to dissident elements, especially the Palestinians.

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## IRAQ

*(Continued from page 37)*

area, and this development has stimulated a revival of jurisdictional claims. The islands are important because of anticipated oil riches in the vicinity and also because of their strategic location. They guard the Strait of Hormuz, through which pass about two-thirds of the Western world's oil supplies and nearly all of Japan's.

Iran maintains that she owned the islands prior to the time the British forcibly occupied them 80 years ago, during the weak Qajar period. Now that the British are withdrawing, the Iranians insist that the islands must be returned to their original owners.

The Iraqi leadership is outspoken in its rejection of the Iranian claims. The Iraqis deny that Iran has even a valid historical claim to the islands. The latter has based her claim, in part, upon the argument that the Qawasem Arab sheikhs at one time utilized the islands in return for the payment of tribute to the Persian government. If this could be proven, it would indicate that the Qawasem Arabs had recognized Persian sovereignty over the islands.

The Iraqis, however, reject this interpretation. They concede that the Qawasems paid money to the Persian authorities late in the eighteenth century, but they argue that this money was not paid in return for the use of the islands. Rather, it was paid for the privilege of using Persian ports on the eastern shores of the Gulf. They insist that there is no proof that the Qawasems paid any money as tribute or rent concerning the islands.

The islands, now claimed by Sharjah and Ras al-Khaima, may thus be the cause of some type of military confrontation involving the Arabs, led by Iraq, and the Iranians.

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## IRAN

*(Continued from page 30)*

tentative "yes"—with several qualifications. Relative to the other options, Iran is capable of assuming the military, administrative and technological burdens associated with keeping the Straits open and her coastal areas under centralized political control. Aside from Kuwait, Iran is also the only state of any size on the Gulf which is extremely dependent upon the unimpeded flow of oil traffic through the Straits.

This dependence has created an unusual degree of convergence between Iranian and Western foreign policy objectives, and the opportunity might be seized to resolve related conflicts. The chief deterrent to Iran's leadership in the Gulf is the number of divisive factors in her relations with other littoral states, although there are no "natural" Gulf leaders in this sense. Yet the sources of some of these conflicts could be eliminated or at least diminished. Western powers should

also consider what nonmilitary resources they might offer Iran to bolster her leadership capabilities.

First, the issue of Iranian claims to what various Arab regimes see as part of their territories has been a not inconsiderable obstacle to regional stability during the last decade. There is no necessity for Iran to discard her vital Gulf interests while recasting her international stance to one less provocative in tone. For example, the publicity attached to Iran's seizure of the three islands near the Straits has been great.

It is clear that Iran's position will be strengthened by a successful settlement, whether it is arrived at publicly or privately. Western contacts with the Foreign Ministry could be used to encourage and support such a deescalation of Iran's diplomatic barrages.

Second, the recent interest in developing the southern provinces should be facilitated by arranging investment or more direct business contacts whenever feasible. There has been some joint activity in large-scale development schemes between United States' corporations and Iran in the Bandar Abbas area. However, other opportunities have been advanced but later pushed aside. It is difficult to support the sufficiency of military loans by themselves, particularly with Iran's difficult foreign exchange situation.

The least expensive combination of strategies would involve the termination of military loans, assuming that Iran is eventually to be granted control over the islands and that the Straits will be relatively secure. The options selected depend upon the nature of the leadership role envisaged for Iran. If it is to be a vigorous one, the arms negotiated to date are insufficient. If it is to be a minimal one, they are probably inappropriate.

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## TURKEY

*(Continued from page 43)*

better than most, should understand that the events and means which brought him to office were, to understate it, constitutionally questionable.

In any case, with the blessing of the army



and with a parliamentary vote of confidence, Erim presented his two-part program which promised strong measures to suppress all extremism and political violence and legislative proposals designed to regulate and control conditions in agriculture, education, finance, justice and general administration. The first major act of the Erim government was the proclamation of martial law at the end of April, 1971, in 11 of the country's 67 provinces. Martial law commanders in the affected provinces instituted a series of extremely severe security measures which were justified by government spokesmen not only because of renewed student violence but by the alleged threat of Kurdish separatist activity and by outside (presumably Syrian) interference in Hatay province, which has a large Arab minority.

Throughout the summer, the Erim government set in motion wave after wave of arrests of students, professors, journalists, labor leaders, artists and writers, and even members of the Grand National Assembly. The Turkish Labor party was dissolved, and its president was arrested. The internationally famous author, Yaşar Kemal, was arrested, as was his wife. Kemal, who was charged with carrying out "Communist propaganda" by translating an English book on Marxism, was convicted and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. Two major Istanbul newspapers, the left-of-center dailies *Cumhuriyet* and *Akşam*, were suspended, with many arrests and imprisonments visited upon their staffs. Following this, the Istanbul military commander declared that there was no intention of suppressing press freedom, but called on the entire Turkish press to submit itself to self-censorship by taking the country's "higher interests" into consideration.

Understandably, these repressive measures, involving the suspension of constitutionally guaranteed rights and resulting in thousands of arrests and detentions, soon attracted international attention. In June, 1971, Prime Minister Erim answered an inquiry from the International Press Institute, which had expressed alarm at the wave of suspensions of newspapers and arrests of journalists. In a

surprisingly obtuse reply, Erim denied that the detention of a comparative handful of journalists among the thousands "whom the authorities have considered it necessary to arrest" could be held to be a threat to press freedom. In any case, he concluded, "we all sincerely hope they [the journalists] will be acquitted."

A further move in the direction of repression was the enactment of new legislation extending martial law powers indefinitely. Under the new provisions, the period for which suspects might be held for investigation was extended from 24 hours to one month; the competence of the special military courts was extended to cover civil offenses, especially press offenses; military courts were also given power to try offenses committed before martial law was introduced and to complete the hearing of cases already before them after martial law ended; and provision was made for all security forces to be placed, if necessary, under military command for martial law purposes.

With these drastic changes it seemed clear that no further impediments remained to military rule by proxy, with the Erim government as the willing instrument of the arrangement. Since the government was willing, even eager, to do the bidding of the army, and since the line between civilian and military control of politics has become hopelessly blurred, Turkey has apparently entered a period of military quasi-dictatorship made all the more bizarre for the insistence that the regime is seeking reform and is preserving legality and constitutionalism. As a result, the very considerable progress Turkey has made since 1950 toward genuine political democracy has been momentarily arrested and is in grave danger of reversal.

This, of course, was not the publicly expressed view of United States Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, who visited Turkey for two days in October, 1971. With impeccable anti-Communist and anti-left-of-center credentials of his own, Agnew saw much to admire in the new regime in Ankara. Underlining the obvious, Vice President Agnew declared that "the new government of Prime

Minister Erim seems to me a very firmly established one, in a very short period of time." The telling points, in Agnew's appraisal of the situation, were the facts that "the officials with whom I talked are very solidly pro-NATO, anti-Communist, pro-West." Agnew's tour of the Eastern Mediterranean made a distinctly favorable impression on him. During a brief visit to neighboring Greece he had similarly seen much to admire in the Athens regime of the Colonels; his experiences in Ankara with the military-backed and dominated Erim government were equally reassuring.

These were the notes struck by the end of 1971 for Turkey: the Turkish military had come to power by proxy; Turkey's major ally, the United States, had pronounced benediction; and the unfortunate Turkish nation's "time of troubles" seemed indefinitely prolonged.

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## ISRAEL

*(Continued from page 48)*

truism of the Israeli system has been that defeat in war would mean politicide—the murder of the state. Israel has sought to assure her security position in order to ensure her survival. To achieve the required security she has insisted on self-reliance and has demonstrated wariness of dependence on others.<sup>33</sup> But, as most Israelis will acknowledge, there is a limit to Israel's self-reliance for security. Shimon Peres, Minister of Communications and former Deputy Defense Minister, has noted:

We can cope with the total Arab strength; we can cope with the present Russian involvement, limited in size and scope, provided the Russians are deterred from the sort of intervention which is not essential to their own national security. . . .<sup>34</sup>

This deterrence is a function for the United States to perform.

<sup>33</sup> This is now partly manifest in a continuing effort to become self-sufficient in arms through local research, development and production of essential military equipment.

<sup>34</sup> Quoted in the *Jerusalem Post*, September 9, 1971.

Despite continuing diplomatic efforts by the United States, the United Nations (and its special emissaries) and various other third parties, accommodation between Israel and the Arabs has not been achieved and the potential for warfare remains. In the absence of peace, the burden of national security will be met, and other aspects of Israeli society will find their place more at the periphery of decision-making than in its central core.

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## BOOKS CONCLUDED

*(Continued from page 47)*

series on revolutions and military rule in the Middle East covered the non-Arab countries on the northern tier. This volume covers the history of four Arab states—Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, detailing in all 39 revolutions and coups d'état from 1936 through 1969. An introductory chapter provides a general review of Arab tensions and political problems, to set the stage for the discussion of specific problems that follows. The typography of the book leaves much to be desired and the photographs are not as clear as the reader would like.

O.E.S.

PEOPLE AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. EDITED BY MICHAEL CURTIS. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1971. 325 pages, index, \$8.95.)

This is a collection of papers presented at the third Annual Conference of the American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East.

O.E.S.

WEST GERMAN REPARATIONS TO ISRAEL. BY NICHOLAS BALABKINS. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1971. 384 pages, appendices, notes and index, \$12.50.)

Nicholas Balabkins has related the history of the reparations paid by the Federal Republic of Germany to Israel.

The author traces the effects of the reparation payments on both Germany and Israel in some detail, with particular attention to the effect on Israel.

O.E.S.

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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of November, 1971, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Disarmament

Nov. 15—U.S. and Soviet negotiators meet in Vienna for the opening session of the sixth round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

### European Economic Community (Common Market)

Nov. 6—The foreign ministers of the 10 countries that would make up an enlarged Common Market meet in Bracciano, Italy, to discuss preparations for a broad European security and economic conference. Eire, Denmark and Norway are potential candidates for E.E.C. membership and Britain has only to sign the treaty of accession and have Parliament approve enabling legislation to complete her membership.

Nov. 9—Norway is in disagreement with the E.E.C. over her wish to retain exclusive fishing rights 12 miles from her coast in contrast to the E.E.C. policy of free fishing rights for member nations.

Nov. 12—The Executive Commission of the E.E.C. expects exports of steel to reach 3.9 million tons in 1972, despite the U.S. 10 per cent import surcharge.

### Latin America

Nov. 13—Led by Brazil, 21 Latin American countries urge the U.N. General Assembly "to take appropriate measures for the creation of a system of collective economic security to encourage sustained development and the expansion of national economies."

Nov. 20—A Reuters dispatch states that this month 19 fishing boats from the U.S. and Canada have been seized by Ecuador for fishing within 200 miles of the Ecuadorian coast.

Robert H. Finch, on a trip to 6 Latin

American countries, assures them that U.S. interest in the area remains strong; Finch is a presidential adviser.

### Middle East Crisis

(See also *U.N.*; *Jordan*)

Nov. 2—President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, Nigerian Head of Government Major General Yakubu Gowon, President Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and President General Joseph Mobutu of Zaire (formerly Congo) arrive in Jerusalem on a peace-making mission.

Nov. 4—King Hussein of Jordan instructs his chief negotiator, Riad el-Mifleh, to press for a "complete and comprehensive agreement" with the Palestinian guerrillas at a conference to take place in Jidda, Saudi Arabia.

U.S. intelligence sources say that Soviet military supplies to Egypt have been cut back to a very low level in the last 3 months.

Nov. 8—The 4 African leaders seeking to clarify the Arab-Israeli positions leave Cairo; they are to report to a 10-nation committee on the Middle East crisis set up by the Organization of African Unity.

Nov. 25—The mission of African heads of state to Egypt and Israel ends.

### Monetary Crisis

Nov. 30—After the first session in Rome of a conference of the Group of Ten, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury John Connally announces that the members have started negotiating a realignment of currencies, the first negotiation since the crisis began last August.

### North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Nov. 14—British Minister of Defense Lord Carrington says Britain will accelerate an

increase in her military forces as part of a program to increase the strength of NATO forces.

## Organization of African Unity

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis; United Kingdom*)

Nov. 26—The Organization of African Unity declares the Rhodesian-British agreement an "outright sellout" of the black Africans to the white Rhodesians.

## Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

Nov. 2—11 oil-producing countries begin talks with the major oil companies aimed at giving these countries participation in the companies and compensation for the reduced value of the dollar.

## Southeast Asia

Nov. 26—The foreign ministers of the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand, members of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations, declare their area a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality," and call on the major powers to respect their declaration.

## United Nations

Nov. 2—Secretary General U Thant is taken to a New York hospital following a dizzy spell.

Chiao Kuan-hua, a Deputy Foreign Minister, is named to head the Chinese (Communist) delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

Nov. 8—6 members of the Chinese U.N. delegation arrive in New York. They are the first Chinese Communist officials to come to the United States since 1950.

Nov. 15—In his first statement at the U.N. General Assembly, Peking's chief delegate, Chiao Kuan-hua, declares that the organization must be run by all member countries and must not be "manipulated and monopolized by the great powers, particularly the U.S. and Soviet Russia."

Nov. 16—The U.N. International Labor Organization gives Peking the Nationalist China seat in the agency by a 36-to-3 vote with 8 abstentions.

Nov. 17—Foreign Minister Abba Eban of Israel advises Thant that Israel will pursue her present policies in Jerusalem, making no mention of Thant's request of two months ago to permit an investigative mission to enter Israel and make a report.

Nov. 19—The Council of the U.N. International Aviation Organization ousts Nationalist China and replaces her with Communist China in its 120-nation assembly.

Nov. 23—Communist China takes her seat as a permanent member of the Security Council.

Because of the upsurge in military activity in East Pakistan in the last 2 days, the U.N. is forced radically to restrict its distribution of relief supplies for East Pakistan's refugees.

## War in Indochina

(See also *U.S., Military*)

Nov. 9—For the first time in more than a year, U.S. B-52 bombers attack enemy positions near Quangtri.

American planes stage retaliatory attacks on anti-aircraft bases near Quanglang and Vinh, the second such attack in North Vietnam in 2 days.

Nov. 11—U.S. B-52 bombers, based in Thailand, strike at enemy forces around Rumlong for the second day in a row.

Nov. 13—For the 4th time in six weeks, a firing accident by U.S. air force planes kills South Vietnamese soldiers. Eight men are killed.

A massive North Vietnamese military buildup is reported by South Vietnamese military sources in the Benkarai and Mugia Passes regions.

Nov. 18—U.S. air support is being increased because of the critical situation in Cambodia, with heavy fighting reported within 10 to 12 miles of the capital, Phnompenh.

Nov. 20—A 10,000-man force of South Vietnamese troops are reported ready to open

a new attack on enemy forces northwest of Pnompenh.

Nov. 23—With a 10,000-man reserve force at the Cambodian border, a 5,000-man South Vietnamese force is said to be pushing into Cambodia near Krek to relieve enemy pressure from that point against Pnompenh.

Nov. 25—The major South Vietnamese military operation in Cambodia, which has been going on for a week, is reporting little contact with the enemy.

Nov. 27—With 25,000 Vietnamese involved in a Cambodian operation, reports indicate that a sizeable force of enemy troops is in the area; the deployment will probably remain as a barrier to North Vietnamese infiltration.

## **West Indian Federation**

Nov. 1—The 6 signers of the Grenada declaration in July—Guyana, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent—publish a report asking these 6 Commonwealth countries to band together by early 1973. Jamaica and Barbados, partners in the first West Indian Federation which collapsed in 1962, do not support the plan; Trinidad and Tobago, also a former member, offers only financial and technical help.

## **AUSTRALIA**

Nov. 2—Informed sources in Washington report that Australia will provide instructors and facilities in South Vietnam to train Cambodian troops.

Nov. 3—Visiting the United States, Prime Minister William McMahon declares that U.S. President Richard Nixon and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird have told him that the U.S. plans to provide a "counterbalance force" to Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean.

## **BELGIUM**

Nov. 4—It is reported from Brussels that the government has decided to bar or expel from Belgium more than 30 Soviet citizens

named as espionage agents by a Soviet defector.

Nov. 8—Premier Gaston Eyskens' coalition Cabinet resigns after yesterday's parliamentary election reveals a sharp rise in regionalism; extremist opposition favoring a federal system for Belgium will play a stronger role in the 212-seat House of Representatives.

Nov. 22—King Baudouin asks Gaston Eyskens to form a new Cabinet.

## **BRAZIL**

Nov. 13—*The New York Times* reports that President Emilio G. Medici has revealed the government's plan for a 3-year, \$150-million program to develop the nation's middle-western area, southwest of Brasilia.

## **CAMBODIA**

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Nov. 9—The Constituent Assembly holds its first meeting and elects In Tam as its president. In Tam, president of the old National Assembly and a former First Vice Premier, is a leader of the opposition to the Lon Nol government.

## **CANADA**

Nov. 16—Acting Prime Minister Mitchell Sharp confirms the possibility that the government may control foreign investment in Canada; opposition parties in the House of Commons raise strong protests.

## **CHILE**

Nov. 9—President Salvador Allende Gossens declares that foreign creditors will be asked to renegotiate some \$3 billion in debt payments.

Nov. 10—Cuban Premier Fidel Castro arrives for a state visit.

Nov. 11—President Allende asks Congress to approve constitutional reforms: a People's Assembly is to replace the legislature.

Nov. 19—President Allende orders the governor of Santiago to institute criminal proceedings against the non-Marxist rector of the University of Chile and a group of op-



position legislators. The university conflict reflects the struggle for power between Marxists and non-Marxists. On November 17, violence spread to the Moneda Presidential Palace.

Nov. 22—The proposal for a single-chamber legislature is opposed by the Christian Democratic party, which terms the proposal a "well-known Marxist tactic."

## CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Nov. 9—*Hsinhua*, the Chinese press agency, listing the leaders attending a rally in Peking yesterday, lists Yeh Chien-ying third in the Politbureau leadership after Premier Chou-En-lai and Chiang Ching, wife of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Yeh is a former army marshal. Defense Minister Lin Piao is not listed.

Nov. 18—In Washington, the Atomic Energy Commission reports that China has held a nuclear bomb test, the first in more than a year, and the 12th in 7 years.

Nov. 23—Mao Tse-tung receives North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong.

Nov. 26—A joint communiqué calling for an end to U.S. fighting in Indochina is issued at the close of Pham Van Dong's visit.

## CUBA

(See *Chile*)

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Nov. 28—After 2 days of national elections that ended yesterday, it is announced that 99 per cent of the electorate favored official candidates. These were the first national elections since the 1968 Soviet invasion.

## EGYPT

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Nov. 19—Touring the Suez Canal front, President Anwar el-Sadat declares that "Egypt's decision is for the battle" and that the troops must prepare to "fight ferociously."

## ETHIOPIA

Nov. 3—In his speech from the Throne that opens the session of Parliament, Emperor Haile Selassie urges Parliament to act on 3 land reform measures.

## FRANCE

Nov. 12—In discussions with Israel now under way in Paris, it is reported that the Israelis are considering accepting reimbursement for the 50 Mirage V fighter planes she paid for which have been held in France under an arms embargo since the 1967 war.

Nov. 27—Rules concerning conflicts of interest between the careers of members of Parliament and private business are tightened by the National Assembly in response to public concern over immorality in public office.

## GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

(See also *Poland*)

Nov. 26—Walter Ulbricht is reelected as nominal head of state and Willi Stoph is reelected Premier by the Volkskammer.

## GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Nov. 20—The chairman of the right-wing National Democratic party, Adolf Von Thadden, resigns because of political differences with party leaders.

Nov. 21—Martin Mussnug is elected chairman of the National Democratic party.

Nov. 25—As the auto wage dispute that began November 22 spreads, some 500,000 West German workers are on strike or locked out of their factories.

## GREECE

Nov. 8—Yannis Horn, publisher of *The Athens News*, receives a 7-month prison sentence because his newspaper carried what a 3-judge court termed a "misleading headline"; Horn is sentenced under the new press law making publishers and edi-

tors share responsibility for the contents of their publications.

Nov. 13—The Greek Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs receives the first Albanian Ambassador to Greece since World War II, implying that Greece has given up her claim to northern Epirus in southern Albania. Greece and Albania, technically at war since 1940, share a 155-mile frontier. In May, 1971, they agreed to exchange ambassadors.

Nov. 14—Lady Fleming is forcibly deported and deprived of her Greek citizenship. (See *Current History*, November, 1971, p. 313.)

## GUATEMALA

Nov. 23—President Carlos Arana Osorio announces that the year-long state of seige has been lifted.

## ICELAND

Nov. 21—Foreign Minister Einar Agustsson declares that on September 1, 1972, Iceland will extend her offshore fishing rights to 50 miles instead of the current 12 miles.

## INDIA

(See also *Pakistan*)

Nov. 3—The official death toll for the cyclone and tidal wave that hit Orissa State October 29–30 is set at 6,000; the unofficial estimate of the death toll is 25,000.

Nov. 5—Visiting Washington, D.C., Prime Minister Indira Gandhi accuses Pakistan of waging a campaign of terror against "East Bengal" (East Pakistan); she tells a meeting of Washington's National Press Club that India has no territorial designs on Pakistan and will not provoke war.

Nov. 8—It is reported by *The New York Times* that India has asked the U.S.S.R. to speed the delivery of already ordered arms and has placed new orders for arms with the U.S.S.R.

Nov. 11—The government says that the ban against foreign newsmen in the border areas around East Pakistan, imposed about

2 weeks ago, is needed for "the safety of foreign guests."

Nov. 13—Returning to New Delhi, Mrs. Gandhi declares that the confrontation with Pakistan is growing "less and less tolerable."

Nov. 18—Mrs. Gandhi tells Parliament that she has rejected a suggestion made by U.N. Secretary General Thant on October 20 offering his good offices to mediate the Indian-Pakistani dispute; she urges instead that Thant try to reach a political settlement in East Pakistan.

Nov. 24—Mrs. Gandhi admits that Indian troops crossed into East Pakistan on November 21 to battle "in self-defense."

Nov. 26—Officials say that on November 24 Indian troops took "defensive action" in Pakistan.

Nov. 28—A statement by Foreign Minister Jagjivan Ram reveals that Indian troops are allowed to penetrate into Pakistan as far as the range of Pakistani guns.

## INDONESIA

(See *Malaysia*)

## IRAN

Nov. 6—It is reported from Beirut that the ruler of Sharza and the ruler of Ras al Khaima have rejected Britain's suggestion that they share sovereignty with Iran in the 3 small, strategically located Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb.

Nov. 30—Abu Musa, Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb are occupied by Iranian troops; Iraq breaks diplomatic ties with Iran and Britain because of the occupation.

## IRAQ

(See also *Iran*)

Nov. 15—A new national charter preparing the way for a new constitution is announced by President Ahmed Hassan Bakr.

## ISRAEL

(See also *Intl. Middle East Crisis, United Nations*)

Nov. 1—In a 90-minute meeting with U.S.

Ambassador Walworth Barbour, Prime Minister Golda Meir and Foreign Minister Abba Eban reveal that they will not accept the U.S. proposal for indirect negotiations with Egypt unless the U.S. promises a steady supply of F-4 supersonic fighter-bombers, the Phantom jets.

Nov. 14—The Cabinet votes to set up a judicial committee of inquiry to investigate charges of theft and corruption at the oil fields in the Sinai Peninsula.

Nov. 21—The retirement of Lieutenant General Haim Bar-Lev as Chief of Staff is confirmed by the Cabinet; it is expected that he will enter the Cabinet in January.

## ITALY

Nov. 6—*The New York Times* reports that a bill has been introduced in the Senate by the Minister of Merchant Marine to curb oil pollution in Italy's territorial waters.

Nov. 21—380 officials of the 3 largest labor confederations agree to merge into a single trade union organization within the next 15 months.

Nov. 22—News-stand operators, customs officials and farm hands strike for a variety of reasons.

Nov. 24—Students riot in Rome and Milan; about half of the nation's high school teachers stay away from school.

Nov. 28—Some 100,000 join in an anti-fascist rally in Rome.

Nov. 29—Top civil servants strike in an attempt to force reform of the administrative machinery.

## JAPAN

Nov. 9—The *Ashai Evening News* publishes the second installment of an interview with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai; Chou says that in order to establish diplomatic relations with Japan, Japan must "outline a clear-cut attitude on the Taiwan question."

Nov. 11—Shigeru Hori, secretary general of the ruling Liberal-Democratic party, says he has written Premier Chou offering to go to Peking to discuss "normalization of relations between China and Japan.

Nov. 16—Emperor Hirohito says that he acted as a constitutional monarch with limited power before and during World War II; his remarks are made at his first official interview with newsmen in his 45 years as Emperor.

Nov. 19—A night-watchman dies during radical rioting in Tokyo; in the past 6 days, the riots have resulted in 1,785 arrests and 25 injuries.

Nov. 24—Voting 285 to 73, the lower house of the Diet approves the Okinawa treaty; Socialists and Communists boycotted the session. Although the treaty must be considered by the upper house, this vote assures ratification.

## JORDAN

Nov. 28—Visiting in Cairo, Premier Wasfi Tal is killed by 3 assassins.

Nov. 29—King Hussein names Ahmed al-Lawzi, Tal's Finance Minister, as Premier.

## LAOS

(See also *Intl. War in Indochina*)

Nov. 8—To cope with a large budget deficit, the government devalues the kip 20 per cent; all national and foreign banks have been closed for 3 days because of heavy sales of foreign exchange.

## LEBANON

Nov. 3—The government reveals that it has negotiated Lebanon's first arms agreement with the Soviet Union.

Nov. 10—Lebanon recognizes the People's Republic of China.

## MALAYSIA

Nov. 20—Malaysia and Indonesia reach agreement on the status of the Strait of Malacca and the Singapore Strait; although the right of "innocent passage" is recognized, a joint statement declares that the straits are not international straits.

## MOROCCO

Nov. 8—The arrest of the former Minister of

Public Works brings to six the number of former Cabinet officers arrested this month on charges of corruption and influence peddling.

## **PAKISTAN**

(See also *India*)

Nov. 2—The government reveals that 53 National Assembly seats taken from Awami League (East Pakistan) members will be filled without contest. 88 other members-elect from Pakistan are told to prepare to take their seats when the Assembly convenes in December, but most of the 88 have joined the Bengali underground or have escaped to India.

Nov. 8—Bengali terrorists set off bombs in Dacca; at least 6 persons have been assassinated in the past 24 hours.

Nov. 9—The government announces that when guerrilla action occurs, whole communities in East Pakistan will be fined collectively.

Nov. 22—Reports reaching Calcutta indicate that Bengali insurgents have launched a major offensive against the Pakistanis on the Western border of East Pakistan.

Pakistan charges that Indian troops have "made some dents in our territory" and are engaged in heavy fighting with the Pakistani army.

Nov. 23—Indian army officers report that their troops have crossed into Pakistan.

Pakistan declares a national emergency as Indian troops attack.

Nov. 25—Military reserves are called up; heavy Indian-Pakistani fighting continues.

Nov. 26—President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan bans the National Awami party.

## **PERU**

Nov. 10—All radio and television stations are placed under state control under the new and sweeping General Telecommunications Law.

## **PHILIPPINES**

Nov. 23—In Manila, an army spokesman reveals that 44 Muslims were killed by gov-

ernment troops in the southern Philippines during special elections November 22.

## **POLAND**

Nov. 3—The U.S. and Poland sign a 5-year pact providing for research and development cooperation in the field of transportation.

Nov. 25—Poland and East Germany reach an agreement easing travel regulations between the 2 countries.

## **RHODESIA**

(See also *United Kingdom*)

Nov. 15—British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Prime Minister Ian Smith open talks in Salisbury on the prospects of settling the British-Rhodesian dispute.

Nov. 16—The Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, a black Rhodesian exile group with headquarters in Zambia, charges that Britain is offering to postpone black majority rule in Rhodesia for 30 years as part of a proposed settlement between Britain and Rhodesia. The reported British terms are rejected by the black exile group.

## **RUMANIA**

Nov. 4—*Agerpres*, the Rumanian press agency, reports that the Minister of Industry and Building Materials has been dismissed for "abusing and transgressing Communist legality."

## **SOUTH AFRICA**

Nov. 1—Under terms of the Terrorism Act, the Anglican Dean of Johannesburg is sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment after a 3-month trial for "terrorist activities."

## **SPAIN**

Nov. 17—It is reported from Madrid that the government has made public its 3d 4-year development plan, calling for a rise in yearly growth from 6.4 per cent to 7 per cent.

Nov. 24—French Foreign Minister Maurice

Schuman, visiting in Madrid, says he cannot meet with Spanish opposition leaders because of the "attitude" of the Franco government.

Nov. 25—The government closes *Madrid*, an independent newspaper.

## SWITZERLAND

Nov. 29—11 women are sworn in as members of the 200-seat National Council; on October 31, women were allowed to vote in a federal election for the first time.

## TANZANIA

(See *Uganda*)

## THAILAND

Nov. 17—A revolutionary council headed by Premier Thanom Kittikachorn disbands the Cabinet, dissolves Parliament, eliminates the constitution and establishes martial law because of "internal strife and a threatening world situation."

Nov. 18—Thanom establishes a 9-man junta; he will head the junta. A new Revolutionary party replaces the ruling United Thai People's party, now abolished.

Nov. 20—All opposition parties are banned; no new parties may be established.

## TURKEY

Nov. 20—The U.S. State Department's senior adviser and coordinator for narcotics matters confirms the fact that the U.S. has agreed to compensate (in the amount of \$35 million) Turkish peasants who agree not to grow opium poppies after 1972.

## UGANDA

Nov. 21—The Uganda-Tanzania border is reopened and direct communication with Tanzania is restored. The border was closed 4 months ago because it was feared that deposed President Milton Obote's supporters were entering Uganda from Tanzania.

## U.S.S.R.

Nov. 1—After 2 days of conferences, party

leader Leonid I. Brezhnev asks East German leaders for the "fastest possible" end to their negotiations with West Germany on the 4-power Berlin agreement.

Nov. 5—In Moscow, Jewish sources reveal that about 7,500 Jews have been allowed to emigrate from the U.S.S.R. so far in 1971.

Nov. 12—The Prelude Lobster Company of the U.S. and the Soviet fishing fleet agree on a settlement of \$89,000 to be paid to the lobster company for damage done to its equipment by Soviet trawlers; the settlement is regarded as a sign of improving commercial relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Nov. 20—In Moscow, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Maurice H. Stans confers with Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin on methods of stimulating U.S.-Soviet trade.

Nov. 22—The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party approves the 1971-1975 5-year plan.

Nov. 23—The Central Committee names Mikhail S. Solomentsev, Premier of the Russian Republic, to the Politburo as a non-voting member.

Nov. 24—Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin asks the U.S. to "give up its attempts to discriminate against the Soviet Union in trade, financing and shipping, as he presents the 1971-1975 5-year plan to the Supreme Soviet.

Nov. 25—Minister of the Natural Gas Industry Aleksei Kortunov reveals that, during the next 5-year plan, 35,000 miles of natural gas pipeline are to be added to bring gas from Northwest Siberia and Central Asia to industrial Russia.

Nov. 26—The Supreme Soviet approves the 1971-1975 5-year plan and the 1972 state budget.

Nov. 30—One of two Soviet Mars spacecraft ejects a capsule containing the Soviet flag to the surface of Mars.

## UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See *Egypt*)



## UNITED KINGDOM

Nov. 2—British Prime Minister Edward Heath tells the new session of Parliament that Britain will play a larger role in European politics as she takes her place in the European Economic Community.

Nov. 5—The Court of Appeal rules that if any item in a magazine or newspaper is judged obscene, its editors are liable for a prison term.

Nov. 6—A published government decree says that the government has assumed the right to sink or destroy ships on the high seas that threaten the British coast with oil pollution.

Nov. 9—Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home tells the House of Commons he will make one more trip to Rhodesia to try to arbitrate that nation's dispute with Great Britain.

Nov. 11—Some 20,000 Protestants stage a protest march in Belfast because of their fear of possible political changes in Northern Ireland.

Nov. 24—The government says it is establishing an accelerated program of public spending because of high unemployment.

Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian D. Smith sign a constitutional settlement ending the 6-year conflict between Britain and Rhodesia, which unilaterally declared her independence in 1965. The settlement, which recognizes the current authority of Rhodesia's 250,000 whites but offers some hope of eventual political authority to 5 million blacks, must be accepted by the "Rhodesian people as a whole" and by the British Parliament before the agreement becomes effective.

Nov. 26—Northern Ireland's Prime Minister Brian Faulkner rejects opposition Labour party leader Harold Wilson's suggestion for a united Ireland.

## UNITED STATES

### Agriculture

Nov. 11—President Richard M. Nixon ac-

cepts the resignation of Secretary of Agriculture Clifford M. Hardin and nominates Earl L. Butz, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture in the Eisenhower administration, to succeed him.

The Agriculture Department estimates that the record corn crop will be 35 per cent larger than last year.

### Civil Rights

Nov. 16—The United States Commission on Civil Rights criticizes the Nixon administration for its failure adequately to enforce civil rights laws and regulations.

### Conservation and Pollution

Nov. 18—Federal district court Judge Sam C. Pointer orders 23 companies to halt production in the Birmingham, Alabama, area in the first use of an injunction against polluters under the emergency provisions of the Clean Air Act of 1970.

### Economy

(See also *Government; Intl, Monetary Crisis*)

Nov. 3—Industry sources reveal that Americans bought more than one million new automobiles in October, a one-month record.

Nov. 5—The nation's unemployment rate eased to 5.8 per cent in October, according to the Labor Department. This compares with 6 per cent in September and 6.1 per cent in August.

Nov. 15—The Commerce Department reports that the United States "net liquidity balance" in international trade was an extraordinary \$9.3-billion dollar deficit in the third quarter of 1971, while the "official reserve transactions balance" was in deficit by a record \$12.1 billion.

Nov. 19—The Labor Department reports that the Consumer Price Index rose only 0.1 per cent after seasonal adjustments in October—the smallest monthly increase since 1967.

Nov. 18—The Commerce Department reports that the gross national product rose \$17.7 billion rather than the previously reported

\$15.9 billion in the third quarter of 1971, while the GNP growth rate was at an annual 3.9 per cent rather than the 2.9 per cent of the preliminary estimate.

## Elections

Nov. 2—Kevin H. White (D.) is reelected mayor of Boston, Massachusetts. Former Police Commissioner Frank L. Rizzo (D.) becomes mayor of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Republican Ralph J. Perk leads his party back to power in Cleveland, Ohio, for the first time in 30 years. Mayors Richard G. Lugar (R.) and Joseph L. Alioto (D.) are reelected in Indianapolis, Indiana, and San Francisco, California, respectively.

William L. Waller overwhelms black civil rights leader Charles Evers in Mississippi's gubernatorial election.

## Foreign Policy

Nov. 4—President Richard M. Nixon and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India confer on matters affecting West Pakistan, East Pakistan and India.

Nov. 5—In "the first step in the expansion of trade with the Soviet Union," the Nixon administration announces arrangements for the sale of approximately \$136-million worth of corn and other livestock feed grains to the U.S.S.R.

Nov. 7—*The New York Times* reports that the United States has decided to cancel licenses for the export of some \$3-million worth of military equipment to Pakistan.

Nov. 17—President Nixon signs the bill ending the ban on the importation of Rhodesian chrome as of January 1, 1972, but he indicates that he will take no action under the legislation during the course of current negotiations between Britain and Rhodesia.

Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans and a 10-man delegation leave for Moscow seeking an expansion of trade with the Soviet Union.

Nov. 18—The Commerce Department approves the licensing of \$5-billion worth of heavy equipment for possible sale by United States companies to the Soviet

Union for the construction of a truck factory. This means that a total of \$1 billion in export licenses has been issued in recent months for the factory, to be built 600 miles south of Moscow.

Nov. 24—The White House announces that the President will confer with French President Georges Pompidou in the Azores next month on his trips to China and the U.S.S.R.

Nov. 26—The Western White House announces that the President will confer with British Prime Minister Edward Heath in Bermuda, December 20-21.

Nov. 27—The White House announces that Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato will meet with the President at the Western White House, January 6-7, 1972.

Nov. 28—The White House announces that West German Chancellor Willy Brandt will meet President Nixon in Florida, December 28-29.

Nov. 29—The White House announces that President Nixon's visit to China will begin on February 21, 1972.

Nov. 30—A 3-year ban on government-backed credits to Communist bloc countries ends as U.S. President Nixon authorizes the Export-Import Bank to fund the sale of U.S. goods to Rumania.

\$125 million in contracts with the Soviet Union to provide oil-drilling and ore-mining equipment in return for nonferrous metals are signed in Moscow by a group of United States concerns and the Soviet Union.

## Government

Nov. 2—The committee regulating interest and dividends in Phase II of the administration's new economic policy sets a guideline of 4 per cent for increases of corporate dividends.

Nov. 3—Secretary of State William P. Rogers says that United States passports will be denied to Americans who refuse to take an oath of allegiance to the constitution.

Nov. 6—Despite widespread opposition, an underground nuclear test takes place on Amchitka Island, Alaska.

Nov. 8—The Pay Board sets a 5.5 per cent standard for wage increases during Phase II. Wage increases scheduled under existing contracts will be allowed except when challenged by a "party of interest." Retroactive payments are disallowed.

The House rejects a proposed constitutional amendment permitting "voluntary" prayer in public schools.

Nov. 9—The Congress sends the White House a \$3.7-billion bill designed to promote the training of more doctors, dentists and other medical personnel.

Nov. 10—By a vote of 61 to 23, the Senate passes a contracted foreign aid bill authorizing \$1.14 billion in economic assistance. The bill now goes to the House. Military aid is still to be acted upon.

The Senate also approves the treaty returning Okinawa to Japan.

The Cost of Living Council discloses its three-level system for monitoring Phase II pay and prices. Companies with sales of \$100 million or more must notify and obtain permission from the Price Commission before raising prices. All pay raises affecting 5,000 or more workers must have the advanced approval of the Pay Board. Companies with sales of \$50 million to \$100 million need not obtain advance approval for price increases but must report quarterly to the Price Commission. Pay raises affecting 1,000 to 5,000 workers must be reported but require no advance notification. Price rises of companies with less than \$50 million in sales and pay raises affecting fewer than 1,000 employees need not be reported but will be bound by the regulations of the commissions and subject to spot checks.

The Council also announces that commercial rents, used cars, and miscellaneous other items are exempt from price controls.

Nov. 11—The Price Commission announces an objective of limiting price increases to an average of 2.5 per cent per annum. It forbids all price rises that are not justified by higher costs. Profit margins, but not total profits, are limited.

The Senate votes for a \$1.5-billion for-

eign military aid authorization by a margin of 65 to 24.

Nov. 12—The Cost of Living Council says that workers who earn less than the federal minimum wage of \$1.60 an hour will be exempt from controls.

Nov. 13—The Pay Board exempts from the pay guidelines raises and benefits due workers because of length of service.

Nov. 14—It is announced that under a strict interpretation of a 1965 rule that staff and volunteer service in the Peace Corps should be limited to five years, 93 of the Corps' most senior and experienced administrators will be dismissed over the next several months.

The *Investigator*, the F. B. I. employees' magazine, reveals that more top aides are being shifted in what appears to be a continuing Bureau shakeup.

Nov. 16—While signing a military procurement authorization bill, President Nixon says he will ignore an amendment to the bill enunciating the policy that the United States should withdraw troops from Indochina, subject only to the release of American prisoners of war.

Nov. 18—The Congress agrees to extend spending authority for the foreign aid program until December 8.

President Nixon signs the two health manpower bills into law.

Nov. 23—By a margin of 81 to 14, the Senate votes in favor of providing Israel with \$500 million in military credits, with half the amount earmarked to cover the purchase of F-4 Phantom Jet fighters. Ronald L. Ziegler, White House press secretary, says that the administration regards the legislation as "permissive" rather than mandatory.

Nov. 24—Paul W. McCracken, chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, resigns as of January 1, 1972. He will be succeeded by Herbert Stein, currently a Council member.

## Labor

(See also *Government*)

Nov. 2—The Labor Department says that,

in the year ending September 30, union wage increases averaged 22.2 per cent less than increases in the equivalent period the year before.

Nov. 13—The 44-day strike of 100,000 soft coal miners is settled. The three-year agreement is estimated to call for a 39 per cent increase in wages and fringe benefits by the time the new contract expires.

Nov. 18—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. adopts a policy of noncooperation towards the Pay Board, which apparently means that its representatives on the Board will vote only when their votes are required to achieve an outcome deemed favorable to labor.

Nov. 19—The Pay Board approves the 15 per cent wage increase provided for in the first year of the recently negotiated three-year soft coal miners' labor contract.

Addressing the biennial convention of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., President Nixon asks labor's cooperation with Phase Two of his economic program.

Nov. 25—President Nixon invokes the Taft-Hartley Act, directing the Attorney General to order an 80-day halt to the Atlantic and Gulf Coast dock strike.

## Military

Nov. 7—A Cornell University group releases a study of the air war in Indochina which contends that, contrary to the course of American ground combat, the Nixon administration is maintaining a high level of bombing generally and actually intensifying the air war in Cambodia and Laos.

Nov. 12—President Nixon announces that 45,000 more United States soldiers will be withdrawn from Vietnam by February 1, 1972. This means that the American force will have been reduced to 139,000 men by that date.

Nov. 15—Nixon administration sources say that General Creighton W. Abrams has been instructed to plan on a tentative reduction of American forces in Vietnam to between 30,000 and 55,000 men by next summer.

## Politics

(See also *Elections*)

Nov. 10—Senator Fred R. Harris (D., Okla.) withdraws from the Democratic presidential race because, he says, "I am broke."

Nov. 14—The Gallup Poll reports that Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D., Me.) now leads Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.) by 50 per cent to 39 per cent as the choice of Democrats for President.

Nov. 16—Los Angeles Mayor Sam Yorty enters the Democratic presidential race and says he will enter the New Hampshire primary.

Nov. 19—Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) formally enters the race for the Democratic nomination for President.

## Supreme Court

Nov. 6—By a vote of 4 to 3, the Supreme Court refuses to delay the hydrogen bomb test at Amchitka Island.

## URUGUAY

Nov. 29—With more than half the votes counted in yesterday's election, Agriculture Minister Juan M. Bordaberry of the ruling Colorado party seems to be winning; the candidate of the leftist Broad Front concedes defeat.


## VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Indochina*)

Nov. 19—Price controls are imposed to counter inflation in the wake of the November 15 devaluation of the piaster by 45 to 55 per cent. The devalued piaster is worth about 400 piasters to the dollar. Under a 1965 law, sharp penalties (which may include the death penalty) are to be imposed for spreading rumors harmful to the economy.

## YUGOSLAVIA

Nov. 24—A strike of Zagreb University students which started yesterday spreads to other university centers in Croatia.



## Countries Of The Middle East

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